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Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Robert W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein 
 
I. Introduction 
A. Processes and Problems 
For over twenty years, the executive branch of the federal government has required 
regulatory agencies to assess the costs and benefits of regulation, and to attempt to ensure that 
the benefits outweigh, or justify, the costs.1 At least in a formal sense, cost-benefit balancing is 
now the official creed of the executive branch, as demonstrated by a series of executive orders.2 
The point cuts across partisan divisions: President Clinton’s approach differed somewhat from 
President Reagan’s, but it shared the fundamental commitment to cost-benefit balancing.3 
Notwithstanding this public commitment, national regulation has hardly come into 
compliance with the principles of cost-benefit balancing.4 This overall pattern of imperfect 
compliance should raise many alarm bells, even for those who have real doubts about cost-
benefit analysis and merely want more coherence and better priority-setting. The general record 
does show numerous successes, in the form of regulations that promise to deliver significant 
benefits at a relatively low price.5 But in many cases, regulations seem to do more harm than 
good.6 Indeed, a close look at federal regulatory policy shows a wide range of problems. Perhaps 
foremost among them is exceptionally poor priority-setting, with substantial resources 
                                                 
1 President Reagan first issued an executive order requiring agencies to use cost-benefit analysis. See Exec. Order 
No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127(1982). 
2 See id. (requiring regulations to pass a cost-benefit test); see also Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986) 
(requiring agencies to submit an annual regulatory plan and to adhere to cost-benefit principles); Exec. Ord. No. 
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638(1994) (requiring agencies to assess all costs and benefits of regulatory alternatives). 
3 President Clinton’s cost-benefit approach expressly required agencies to include qualitative measures of costs and 
benefits, see Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), while President Reagan’s approach did not specify 
which costs and benefits were to be measured, see Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982). 
4 See Eric Posner, “Controlling Agencies With Cost-Benefit Analysis”, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68, 
no.4, Fall 2001; Robert W. Hahn et al., “Assessing Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Failure of Agencies To 
Comply With Executive Order 12866”, 23 Harvard. J. L & PP 859 (2000) (suggesting that the absence of 
information on net benefits in Regulatory Impact Analyses leads to the conclusion that agencies have failed to carry 
out cost-benefit analyses). 
5 See Robert W. Hahn et al., Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? 15-19 (2000) (evaluating twenty-four 
regulations whose mortality benefits constitute 90% of total benefits and concluding that nine pass a cost-benefit test 
because their net cost per statistical life saved is less than $5 million); Cass R. Sunstein, “Cost-Benefit Default 
Principles”, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1651, 1661 (2001) (providing examples where “cost-benefit analysis has ... led to 
regulations that accomplish statutory goals at lower cost”). 
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sometimes going to small problems, and with little attention being paid to some serious 
problems.7 There are also unnecessarily high costs, with $146 to $229 billion being attributable 
to compliance costs each year.8  
We do not contend that an assessment of quantified costs and quantified benefits tells us 
everything that we need to know or that precise numbers are always possible9 But when the costs 
are high and the benefits low or nonexistent, something seems seriously amiss, especially 
because an absence of significant benefits signals a likely absence of significant savings in terms 
of health, safety, or the environment. Especially in a period in which economic growth and 
improved safety and health are among government’s highest priorities, this is a major problem. 
And indeed, the recent reports of the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), designed to 
capture the costs and benefits of a wide range of regulations, reveal some disturbing numbers: 
the EPA’s regulation for financial assurance for municipal solid waste landfills has monetized 
benefits of $0, but costs of $100 million, and this is expected for the next thirteen years;10 for the 
next thirteen years, OSHA’s methylene chloride regulation will have annual costs of $100 
million and annual benefits of $40 million;11 the cost-benefit ratio for airbag depowering 
regulation seems bad, though there is uncertainty in the data.12  
Consider Table 1, which lists some estimates of costs and benefits of recent regulations.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 See Hahn et al., supra note 5, at 23 (finding that over half of the twenty-four regulations studied were likely to 
cause an increase in mortality risk). 
7 This is the theme of Stephen Breyer’ recent book. See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward 
Effective Risk Regulation (1993). 
8 Unless otherwise noted, year dollars are taken from the source that is cited. In this case, OMB estimates that the 
cost of social regulation as of 1999 is between $146 and $229 billion in 1996 dollars. Office of Management and 
Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations tbl.4 (2000) [hereinafter OMB 2000 Report Charts]  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-charts.pdf. In an earlier report to Congress, OMB notes that the 
EPA’s Cost of Clean report in 1990 estimated the cost of environmental regulations as of 1988 to be $101 billion 
(1996 dollars). OMB used this figure as a baseline and added the cost of all major environmental regulations issued 
by the agencies between 1987 and 1996 to estimate the annual cost of environmental regulation in 1997 at $144 
billion (1996 dollars). Office of Management and Budget, Report to Congress on the Cost and Benefits of Federal 
Regulation tbl.1 (1997) at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/chap2.html. 
9 See Kenneth Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation 8 (1996) 
(recommending that analysts “give due consideration to factors that defy quantification but are thought to be 
important”), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org.publications/books/benefit_cost_analysis.pdf. Lisa 
Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, “Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection,” U. 
Penn L. Rev. 
10 OMB 2000 Report Charts, supra note 8, tbl.12. 




Table 1: Questionable Cost-Benefit Ratios13 
(Net Benefits of Regulations: in millions, adjusted to 1996 dollars) 
 
Regulation 2000  2005 2010 2015 
Exposure to Methylene 
Chloride 
-60  -60 -60 -60 
Roadway Worker 
Protection 
0 0 0 0 
Financial Assurance for 
Municipal Solid Waste 
Landfills 
-100 -100 -100 -100 
Pulp and Paper Effluent 
Guidelines 
-150 to 0 -150 to 0 -150 to 0 -150 to 0 
Ozone Standards 0 -235 to 240 -840 to 1190 -9,200 to -1000 
Child Restraint System -40 to 40 -40 to 40 -40 to 40 -40 to 40 
Vessel Response Plans -220 -220 -220 -220 
Nitrogen Oxide Emission 
from new Fossil Fuel 
Fired Steam Generating 
Units 
-57 to 29 -57 to 29 -57 to 29 -57 to 29 
 
It might seem that existing executive orders would prevent or reduce outcomes of this 
kind, but apparently these orders have not had a large effect.14 Indeed, there is some evidence 
that the existing orders have had little impact on what agencies actually do.15  
This is no mere academic objection. Expensive regulation may well increase prices, 
reduce wages, and increase unemployment (and hence poverty).16 Resources now being devoted 
to small or imaginary problems might be diverted instead to areas where, by all accounts, they 
could produce far more good. Cost-benefit analysis is not an effort to reduce all human goods to 
                                                 
 
14 See Hahn & Litan, supra note 13. Another study suggests that roughly half of the government’s final regulations 
would not pass a cost-benefit test. See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: Assessing the Government's Numbers 
(AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 99-6, 1999); see also Hahn & Litan, supra 
note 13, at tbl.1. (showing that a significant number of recent regulations would fail a strict cost-benefit test). 
15 See Posner, supra note 4. For an examination of the impact of the efficiency effects of the executive orders on 
regulation, see Scott Farrow, Evaluating the Regulatory Process and Government Performance: Does Executive 
Office Oversight Matter? (Discussion Paper, Oct. 18, 1999) http://www.epp.cmu.edu/csir/. Farrow finds that 
executive office oversight does not have a significant efficiency-improving impact on the difference between 
proposed and final regulations, or on the cost effectiveness of regulation. Id. at 2. A partial reason is that some 
statutes forbid cost-benefit balancing, but we believe that this is not the whole picture. 
16 To offer a few more details: If regulation increases marginal costs for firms, it is certain to lead to higher prices; if 
regulation increases a firm’s labor costs, wages will be reduced; but it is less clear whether regulation will increase 
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numbers, but to increase the likelihood that regulation will actually produce human good. 
According to one study, better allocations of health expenditures could save, each year, 60,000 
additional lives at no additional cost––and such allocations could maintain the current level of 
lives saved with $31 billion in annual savings.17 We do not believe that cost-benefit analysis 
should be the exclusive basis for assessing regulation, but we do believe that it is an important 
tool, and that a movement toward improved balancing is likely to promote many social goals, 
including better health and increased longevity.18 This somewhat abstract claim has been 
dramatized by repeated demonstrations that some regulations create significant substitute risks19–
–and that with cheaper, more effective tools, regulation could achieve its basic goals while 
saving billions of dollars.20 
 
B. A Deeper and Wider Commitment to Cost-Benefit Analysis 
How can regulation be moved in more sensible directions? This is a large question, and 
we will not attempt to answer it thoroughly here. But it seems to us that much of the answer lies 
in improved institutions, and, in particular, in institutional reforms that increase the role of cost-
benefit analysis in regulatory policy as a way of drawing attention to the likely effects of 
alternative courses of action. Of course statutory changes would be necessary in many cases. We 
emphasize two points here. First, the commitment to cost-benefit analysis has been far too 
superficial, and in some ways mostly symbolic; it should be deepened through efforts to 
strengthen its actual role. Second, the commitment to cost-benefit analysis has been far too 
narrow; it should be widened through efforts to incorporate independent regulatory commissions 
within its reach.  
                                                                                                                                                             
unemployment, at least in the long-run. If the regulation increases the cost of capital relative to labor, employment 
might even increase. 
17 Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, “The Opportunity of Costs of Haphazard Social Investments” in Life-
Saving, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved 167-182 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996). 
18 See Hahn et al., supra note 5, at 24 (positing that evaluating the mortality implications of regulatory costs is a 
useful complement to cost-benefit analysis). 
19 See Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert 
Wiener eds., 1995) (containing case studies demonstrating that risk substitution exists). 
20 See, e.g., A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Problem 315 (2000) (stating that 
the emissions-trading program “can both achieve stated environmental objectives and reduce compliance costs”); 
Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 31, 35-41 
(Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2d ed. 2000) (demonstrating that tradable permit programs can achieve 
environmental goals and save money). 
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In this Article, we propose and explore a modest but potentially significant step toward 
greater depth and width: a new executive order on federal regulation, building on lessons derived 
from the experience of the last two decades. The proposed order, designed to replace the current 
one offers eight basic innovations over existing practice. Most of these address the issue of 
depth; the last point goes to the issue of width. 
1. Promoting Compliance. Our proposal attempts to ensure that agencies will actually 
comply with the basic principles established in previous orders, in part by explicitly requiring 
agency compliance with OMB guidelines for regulatory analysis. This would be an extremely 
significant step, because OMB’s guidelines have been widely ignored,21 and because compliance 
with those guidelines would significantly increase rationality and coherence in the regulatory 
process.  
2. “Prompting” Regulation. Our proposed order strengthens the role of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) and explicitly creates a mechanism by which 
OIRA might “prompt” regulation as well as constrain it. This is an important way to ensure that 
cost-benefit analysis will be used not simply to reduce and limit regulation, but also to spur 
regulation in those cases where it will do more good than harm.22 By creating a mechanism for 
prompting regulation, our order moves cost-benefit analysis in the direction of service as a 
technical tool for improving regulation, rather than simply being a mechanism for reducing it.  
3. Considering Substitute Risks and Not Regulating Trivial Problems. We include 
explicit requirements that, to the extent permitted by law, agencies (a) consider the substitute 
risks introduced by regulation and (b) do not attempt to regulate trivial or de minimis problems. 
These requirements build on some important developments within the federal courts, which have 
created default rules authorizing agencies to consider substitute risks and to make de minimis 
exceptions from regulatory requirements.23 These default rules are mirrored in federal 
                                                 
21 See Hahn et al., supra note 4, at 861 (concluding that agencies have ignored OMB guidelines from the fact that 
RIAs “do not provide enough information to allow regulatory agencies to make decisions that will maximize the 
efficiency or effectiveness of a rule”). 
22 Warren, Edward W., and Gary E. Merchant, “More Good Than Harm: A First Principle for Environmental 
Agencies and Reviewing Courts.” 20 Ecology Law Quarterly 379-440 (1993). 
23 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1669-76. 
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legislation, which often bars regulation of trivial risks,24 and which also calls, in many places, for 
attention to substitute risks.25  
4. Explaining Rationales for Action When Benefits Do Not Exceed Costs. We require 
that benefits should generally be expected to exceed costs, and ask agencies to provide a 
rationale for proceeding with any regulation that fails to pass a cost-benefit test (based on best 
quantifiable estimates).26 Some statutes explicitly require agencies to act even if the benefits fall 
short of the costs27. There may also be cases in which an agency believes that it is worthwhile to 
proceed even though the quantifiable benefits do not exceed the quantifiable costs. Either way, 
we believe that accountability and transparency would be enhanced if the head of an agency 
were required to explain why a regulation is being adopted. 
   5. Making Underlying Analysis Available. For each significant regulatory action, we 
ask the appropriate agency to include an underlying analysis of the benefits and costs, so that 
interested parties inside and outside of the government can understand how the results were 
obtained, and perform their own analysis of the issue if they so choose. We believe that this 
requirement will also promote transparency and enhance accountability.  
   6. Formulating Regulatory Retrospective and Plan. We require each agency to create an 
annual regulatory retrospective and an annual regulatory plan. The retrospective should contain a 
general analysis of the costs and benefits of significant regulations; this analysis will facilitate 
OMB’s statutory task of compiling an annual account for the executive branch as a whole.28 The 
annual regulatory plan, following a similar requirement in the existing executive order,29 would 
contain an account of what the agency aspires to do in the following year. The purpose of the 
regulatory plan is to ensure early, rather than last-minute, OIRA involvement in planning, and 
also to promote the involvement of high-level agency staff at an early stage.  
                                                 
24 This is the prevailing interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, under both the toxic substance 
provisions and the more general provisions of the Act. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 
U.S. 607, 639 (1980); Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
25 42 USC § 7411(a)(1) (1994). 
26 For a related view, see Robert W. Crandall et al., An Agenda for Federal Regulatory Reform (1997). Crandall et 
al. recommend that Congress require all regulatory agencies to report the quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits 
of regulations. Id. at 12. In addition, the authors argue that “Congress should require that all new regulations costing 
more than $100 million annually pass a broadly defined benefit-cost test.” Id. (emphasis omitted).  
27 This could be the case, for example, where a specific performance standard for tailpipe emissions is statutorily set 
and regulations require automakers to meet that standard regardless of the outcome of a cost-benefit test. See 42 
U.S.C. 7409(b)(1). 
28 This task is required by the FY2000 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-58, § 
628(a)), 113 Stat. 472, 472-73 (1996). 
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 7. Incorporating Independent Agencies. For the first time, we include the independent 
regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (“CPSC”), and Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), within the ambit of 
the order. This is a significant departure from existing practice. We believe that the innovation is 
justified because these agencies are engaged in particularly important regulatory functions. The 
inclusion of independent agencies raises obvious legal issues, which we discuss below.30   
8. Authorizing Judicial Review. We provide for limited judicial review of the documents 
and materials generated as a result of the order. The goal of this provision is to increase the 
likelihood that agencies will take the order’s requirements seriously. It also authorizes the 
invalidation of arbitrary and capricious agency action, to the extent that the relevant materials are 
pertinent, as a matter of law, in a test of the legality of agency conduct. 
We believe that a new executive order is probably the best way to move in the directions 
suggested by these ideas. There are, however, reasonable counterarguments. For well over a 
year, the Bush Administration has been operating under an executive order issued by President 
Clinton, and there are real virtues in a situation in which regulatory oversight under a president 
of one party is done under a set of principles issued by another. It is important to give such 
oversight both the reality and the appearance of nonpartisanship. A possible approach would be 
to retain the Clinton order and to issue a supplemental order that embodies some of the proposals 
described here. In any case many of the ideas in this Essay might be promoted without a new 
order. Greater depth, at least, might well be achieved simply by a stronger effort, by OIRA, to 
ensure compliance with existing requirements,31 and, indeed, by an insistence on many of the 
proposals made here.32 If a new executive order were not to be issued, considerable progress 
might well be made with these suggestions in mind. For those who lack enthusiasm for our 
recommendations, we hope that the discussion will nonetheless cast light on the actual 
performance of the federal government after twenty years of experience under a (nominal) 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 See infra note 73 (describing the regulatory plan requirement of Executive Order No. 12,866). 
30 See infra Part III.G. 
31 See John D. Graham, “Executive Regulatory Review: Surveying the Record, Making It Work,” Address Before 
the Weidenbaum Center Forum (Dec. 17, 2001), 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/graham_speech121701.html (“The changes we are making at OMB are 
not headline-grabbers: No far-reaching legislative initiatives, no rhetoric-laden executive orders, and no campaigns 




commitment to cost-benefit analysis.33 Indeed, some critics will be pleased to see the modest 
effects of cost-benefit requirements to date.34 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I briefly outlines the development of executive 
orders on federal regulation. At the same time, it provides an account of what we mean by the 
still-controversial idea of cost-benefit balancing, and an exploration of the lessons from two 
decades of experience with executive orders on federal regulation. We emphasize here the extent 
to which the commitment to cost-benefit analysis has been, too much of the time, symbolic 
rather than real. Part II explains and defends our innovations. Part III explores the limits of 
reform via executive order, and offers an account of what else might be done. Following a brief 
conclusion, the attached Appendix contains the text of our proposed executive order.  
 
II. Clarifications and Preliminaries 
A. What is Cost-Benefit Analysis? 
Before proceeding to the details, it is important to clarify our basic understanding of cost-
benefit analysis. We mean to use the term in a modest, nonsectarian way, seeing cost-benefit 
analysis as a tool and a procedure, rather than as a rigid formula to govern outcomes.35 Thus 
understood, cost-benefit analysis requires a full accounting of the consequences of an action, in 
both quantitative and qualitative terms. Officials should have this accounting before them when 
they make decisions.  
We do not insist that regulators should be bound by the “bottom-line” numbers; 
qualitative considerations, and a sense of distributive impacts (not themselves considered 
“benefits” in the analysis), are permitted to influence public officials. But if regulators are to 
proceed, they should be prepared to explain either how the benefits exceed the costs, or if they 
do not, why it is nonetheless worthwhile to go forward. When the benefits do not exceed the 
costs, it would make sense to adopt a presumption against proceeding––a presumption that might 
                                                                                                                                                             
32 Of course, it would not be possible, without a new executive order, to incorporate the independent regulatory 
commissions under the process of OIRA review. 
33 We do not deal here with a pervasive problem: OIRA has a small staff (about fifty) and many regulations to 
review (about 600 are deemed significant each year). To produce the improvements that we think desirable, it would 
obviously be important to ensure that OIRA’s staff is large enough to do the necessary work. 
34 Supra 10. 
35See Kenneth Arrow et al, supra note 9, at 3 (“Benefit-cost analysis should play an important role in informing the 
decision making process....”) (emphasis added); Matthew D. Adler &Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit 
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be rebutted by showing, for example, that children would be the principal beneficiaries of the 
regulation, or that poor people would be disproportionately benefited. We therefore understand 
cost-benefit analysis to require a certain procedure: A quantitative and qualitative accounting of 
the effects of regulation, together with a duty to explain the grounds for action unless the benefits 
exceed the costs. On this view, the antonym to regulation guided by cost-benefit analysis is 
regulation undertaken without anything like a clear sense of the likely consequences––or 
regulation that amounts to a stab in the dark.36  
What are the arguments for cost-benefit analysis, so understood? We do not attempt to 
answer this question in detail37; but it is important to see the central points. The standard 
response is economic in character: Regulation should ordinarily promote social welfare, and 
while social welfare might be promoted by regulations that fail cost-benefit analysis,38 cost-
benefit analysis is an imperfect but useful and administrable proxy for the inquiry into the social 
welfare question. At the very least, it seems clear that regulation is unlikely to promote social 
welfare when its costs are very high and its benefits are very low––especially when we consider 
the fact that high costs are likely to be translated into some combination of higher prices, lower 
wages, and lower returns to capital. It is not necessary to think that government should be treated 
as some maximizing machine in order to conclude that officials should know the consequences 
of regulation before they act, and that they should be reluctant to issue regulations that promise 
to cost much and to deliver little.  
Of course it is possible that in practice, quantitative cost-benefit analysis will have 
excessive influence on government decisions, drowning out “soft variables.” Since the numbers 
are not all that matters, any such effect would be a point against cost-benefit analysis. But to 
date, the actual record does not support this concern. To take just one example, the EPA’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. Legal Studies 1105, 1106 (2000) (“CBA is properly conceptualized 
as a welfarist decision procedure....”) (emphasis added). 
36 We are assuming throughout that regulators are acting in a situation of risk (where probabilities can be assigned to 
various outcomes) rather than uncertainty (where no such probabilities can be assigned). In a situation of 
uncertainty, when existing knowledge does not permit regulators to assign probabilities to outcome other decision 
rules may be useful, because it is exceedingly hard to do cost-benefit analysis. In such circumstances, the maximin 
principle could be used (choose the policy with the best worst-case outcome). See Jon Elster, Explaining Technical 
Change 185-207 (1983), for a helpful discussion.  
37 For a discussion of the value of cost-benefit analysis, see Arrow et al, supra note 9, at 3-6; Cass R. Sunstein, Risk 
and Reason (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2002). 
38 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, “Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,” 109 Yale L.J. 165, 245-46 (1999) 
(stating that “maximizing overall well-being is an important role of the government” and providing examples of 
situations where the outcome of cost-benefit analysis should be disregarded in favor of welfarist considerations). 
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decision to go forward with new controls on arsenic in drinking water was supported partly on 
the ground that nonquantifiable variables tipped the balance. We will suggest that in appropriate 
cases, distributional considerations should also count. The risk that cost-benefit analysis will 
drown out relevant variables is not a reason to abandon the analysis, but to take steps to ensure 
against any such effect. 
It is useful to compare cost-benefit analysis with the “precautionary principle,” often 
invoked as a foundation for risk regulation and indeed as an alternative to cost-benefit analysis.39 
The precautionary principle asks government to prevent risks, even if they are quite speculative, 
on the ground that it is important to guard against large problems even if they might not come to 
fruition. Of course it is worthwhile to take some precautions against serious risks, even if the 
probability of their occurrence is well under 100%. We think, however, that the precautionary 
principle is an inadequate guide to action, simply because dangers often lie on both sides of the 
equation.40 Consider the case of genetic modification of food, a process that does carry some 
risks: A failure to allow genetic modification might well result in many deaths, and a small 
probability of many more, simply because genetic modification might well deliver cheaper and 
healthier food.41 Doesn’t the precautionary principle require genetic modification of food at least 
as much as it prohibits it?  
Or consider the question whether to ban the use of DDT. The precautionary principle 
might well seem to require the ban, because DDT imposes health risks for birds and mammals, 
including human beings. But the ban itself seems to be banned by the principle, because any such 
ban might lead to either unsafe or more expensive substitutes, and in either case the ban creates a 
                                                 
39 See Risk and the Precautionary Principle (Julian Morris ed., 2000).Some suggested alternatives to cost-benefit 
analysis are nothing of the kind. For example, Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection (2002), discuss technology-based regulation and pollution trading as 
preferable alternatives. Id. at 31. But cost-benefit analysis, far from being an alternative to technology-based 
regulation, is a tool for assessing what kind of regulation makes best sense. Pollution trading is a low-cost method of 
bringing about compliance with regulatory goals. But in any trading system, it is necessary to “cap” overall 
emissions, and cost-benefit analysis is a way of helping to decide on the most sensible cap. Heinzerling and 
Ackerman are right to say that many “regulatory programs have been a terrific success without using cost-benefit 
analysis to set pollution limits.” Id. at 32. As we have suggested, cost-benefit analysis helps to identify the 
successes. Our claim is that we could have more successes, and better successes, and fewer failures if we attempted 
to analyze the consequences first. 
40 See Jonathan Weiner, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in The Risk Assessment of Environmental and Human 
Health Hazards (Dennis D. Paustenbach ed., 2d ed. 
41 Indur Goklany, Applying the Precautionary Principle in a Broader Context, in Risk and the Precautionary 
Principle, supra note 33, at 189, 207-220. 
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(speculative) risk of serious harms.42 Or consider an effort to introduce stringent regulation of 
arsenic in drinking water. It is possible to justify the regulation on the ground that low levels of 
arsenic might create substantial risks; but it is also possible to complain that the expensive 
regulation (costing, say, $200 million) itself creates a risk of mortality effects, a risk that would 
be forbidden by the precautionary principle. What should government do? 
The precautionary principle, taken for all that it is worth, is thus frequently paralyzing: It 
stands as an obstacle to regulation and to nonregulation, and to everything in between. Of course 
speculative harms often deserve attention. But we think that too much of the time, the 
precautionary principle is merely a combination of rhetoric and myopia, having force only when 
people look at an essentially arbitrary part of the picture, rather than at the whole. A competent 
cost-benefit analysis takes good account of what is sensible in the precautionary principle, by 
asking regulators to attend to low-probability risks of significant harms. Cost-benefit analysis 
subsumes this risk, as it does all others, into the overall assessment of welfare effects of 
regulation.43 Indeed the most sensible understandings of the precautionary principle emphasize 
the need for an overall assessment, and insist on exploring all of the risks at stake, including low-
probability, potentially catastrophic risks.44 
 A less familiar argument for cost-benefit analysis, growing out of our doubts about the 
precautionary principle, is cognitive in character. One goal of cost-benefit analysis is to 
overcome cognitive limitations by ensuring that people have a full, rather than limited, sense of 
what is at stake.45 People often miss the systemic effects of risk regulation;46 cost-benefit 
analysis is a way of putting those effects squarely on-screen. At the same time, cost-benefit 
analysis helps overcome the problems created by cognitive heuristics that can lead people to 
misunderstand the magnitude of risks, by allowing an accounting of the actual consequences of 
                                                 
42 See id. at 190-92. 
43 Obviously, it is impossible to take extra caution (or spend more) on all activities, simply because there is a finite 
budget constraint at any point in time. For a good overview of the precautionary principle, see Kimberly M. 
Thompson et al., “Decision-analytic Refinements of the Precautionary Principle,” 4 J. of Risk Res. 127 (2001). Some 
suggested alternatives to cost-benefit analysis are nothing of the kind. For example, Lisa Heinzerling and Frank 
Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless: Cost Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection (2002), discuss technology-
based regulation and pollution trading as preferable alternatives. Id. at 31. But cost-benefit analysis, far from being 
an alternative to technology-based regulation, is a tool for assessing what kind of regulation makes best sense. 
Pollution trading is a low-cost method of bringing about compliance with regulatory goals. But in any trading 
system, it is necessary to “cap” overall emissions, and cost-benefit analysis is a way of helping to  
44 See Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle (2001). 
45 See Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 36. 
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current hazards and of the effects of reducing them.47 To the extent that people’s emotions are 
getting the better of them, by producing massive concern about small risks,48 cost-benefit 
analysis should help put things in perspective, and at the same time might help to calm popular 
fears. And if people are indifferent to a risk that is actually quite large, cost-benefit analysis will 
help to stir them out of their torpor. The result should be to help with cognitive distortions and to 
produce sensible priority setting.  
There are democratic advantages as well.49 Interest groups often manipulate policy in 
their preferred directions, sometimes by exaggerating risks, sometimes by minimizing them, and 
sometimes by mobilizing public sentiment in their preferred directions. An effort to produce a 
fair accounting of actual dangers should help to diminish the danger of interest-group 
manipulation. More generally, cost-benefit analysis should increase the likelihood that citizens 
generally, and officials in particular, will be informed of what is actually at stake. By itself, this 
is a large democratic gain.  
Of course, interest groups will also try to manipulate the numbers in their preferred 
directions. Industry will tend to exaggerate the costs and minimize the risks. Public interest 
groups will do the opposite. A government that attempts to produce cost-benefit analysis will 
face a formidable task; it is possible that government will lack the information necessary to do 
this task well. But if there is a degree of accuracy, and if ranges are specified where there is 
uncertainty, cost-benefit analysis can be seen, not as some antidemocratic effort to tyrannize 
people with numbers, but instead as an indispensable tool of democratic self-government. 
We can go further. Prospective estimates of both costs and benefits often turn out to be 
wrong.50 This is not merely because of interest group pressures. One reason is that officials lack 
the extensive information that would permit them to take accurate predictions; indeed, the 
informational demand on agencies is overwhelmingly, especially because technologies change 
                                                                                                                                                             
46 See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure 1-10 (Rita & Robert Kimbel, trans. 1996) (introducing ways in which 
people discount risk and the potential negative consequences that follow). 
47 See Roger Noll & James Krier, “Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation,” 19 J. Legal 
Stud. 747, 762 (1990) (describing how these “pathologies” can affect estimates of risk). 
48 See George Loewenstein et al., Risk As Feelings, 127 Psychol. Bull. 267 (2001). 
49 Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, “Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market 
Incentives,” 13 Colum. J. Env. L. 171, 172-75, 178-90 (1988) (emphasizing the democratic virtues of economic 
incentives). 
50 See OMB, 1999 Report to Congress, at 40-43. 
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over time.51 An enduring problem for regulatory policy is the absence of precise information on 
the cost or benefit sides. This point should be taken, not as a criticism of cost-benefit analysis as 
such, but as a reason for continuous monitoring and updating.52 Our emphasis on retrospective 
analysis and on prompt letters is intended to take account of the frequent inadequacy of 
prospective estimates. 
There are numerous challenges to cost-benefit analysis as a regulatory tool.53 We cannot 
discuss those challenges in this space. We suspect that many of them are rooted, at bottom, in 
pragmatic considerations-–in a belief that in practice, cost-benefit analysis will be used as an 
obstacle to desirable regulation. According to some skeptics, the antonym of cost-benefit 
analysis is not the unguided stab in the dark, but regulatory protection itself. If this were so, the 
argument for cost-benefit analysis would be greatly weakened. But the evidence does not support 
this pessimistic prediction;54 indeed, cost-benefit analysis has helped to spur regulation, not 
merely to stop it.55 We believe that, in principle, cost-benefit analysis has a great deal of promise, 
and that when it has been used, it has often made things better rather than worse.56 Of course, the 
case for cost-benefit analysis will depend, in large part, on what people do with it in the future. 
 
B. History 
 Since 1980, all three branches of American government have shown increased interest in 
cost-benefit balancing.57 Our emphasis here is on the actions of the executive branch, which has 
had a longstanding interest in cost-benefit balancing, an interest that cuts across partisan 
divisions.58 A brief historical review will set the stage. 
                                                 
51 See Bradley Karkkainen, “Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental 
Performance,” Columbia Law Review (Forthcoming 2002). 
52 See id. (urging a reform of NEPA that would call for careful attention to new information over time). 
53 See Lisa Heinzerling, “Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,” 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998) (noting that an 
assessment of the cost-effectiveness of regulating risk is dependent on subjective evaluations of discounting future 
benefit, risk assessment, and regulatory purpose). see Heinzerling and Ackerman, “Pricing the Priceless,” supra 10. 
54 For varying perspectives, see “Economic Analysis at EPA” (Richard Morgenstern ed. 1999); Eric Posner, 
University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 68, no. 4,(forthcoming 2002). 
55 For a discussion of the role of economic analysis in spurring regulation of lead in gasoline and regulation of 
CFCs, destructive of the ozone layer, see “Economic Analysis at EPA,” supra note 44. See also the discussion of 
prompt letters, infra Part II.B.. 
56 See “Economic Analysis at EPA,” supra note 44 
57 Within Congress, see e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1532, 1535 (requiring cost-benefit analyses and explanations for agency 
actions); within the executive branch, see supra note 2 (noting presidential directives on cost-benefit requirements). 
58 See Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 36, at ch. 1 . 
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 President Nixon inaugurated the process of this general sort as long ago as 1970, with a 
mechanism for “Quality of Life” reviews of administrative action.59 President Carter introduced 
a similar process with his Regulatory Analysis Review Group, designed to conduct interagency 
analysis of cost-effectiveness analysis, required for “significant” rules.60 But the decisive step 
came under President Reagan, with the formal creation of a mechanism for OMB review of 
major regulations.  
 The most important innovations in President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291 were: (1) 
a set of substantive principles for all agencies to follow, “to the extent permitted by law,” 
including a commitment to cost-benefit analysis; (2) a requirement that a Regulatory Impact 
Analysis, including cost-benefit analysis, accompany all “major” rules; and (3) a formal 
mechanism for OMB oversight, with a general understanding that OMB had some (undefined) 
substantive control over what agencies would actually do. President Reagan considered 
subjecting the independent agencies to the new order, but ultimately declined to do so, partly 
because of concerns about legal authority, but mostly because of fears of an adverse 
congressional reaction.61 The independent agencies were asked voluntarily to comply with 
Executive Order 12,291; all of them declined. 
 Executive Order 12,291 proved extremely controversial.62 Nonetheless, President Reagan 
expanded on the basic idea four years later with Executive Order 12,498.63 That order established 
a requirement that agencies submit “annual regulatory plans” to OMB for review. The result was 
an annual publication, the Regulatory Program of the United States, which contains a discussion 
of all proposed actions that might be either costly or controversial. Executive Order 12,498 
served to increase the authority of agency heads over their staffs, by exposing proposals to top-
level review at an early stage. But it also increased the authority of OMB, by allowing OMB 
supervision over basic plans, and by making it hard for agencies to proceed without OMB 
preclearance.  
                                                 
59 See Richard R. Nathan, The Plot That Failed and the Administrative Presidency 45-49 (1975). 
60 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, “Reinventing the Regulatory State,” 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1995). 
61 See Peter M. Shane & Harold H. Bruff, The Law of Presidential Power 355-359 (1988) (describing and 
questioning the use of the presidential supervisory power with respect to congressional legislation). 
62 See, e.g., Thomas McGarity, Rationalizing Regulation (1990) . 
63 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985). 
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 Under President George Bush, the principal innovation was the Council on 
Competitiveness, chaired by the Vice President.64 The Council engaged in occasional review of 
agency rules, operating as a kind of supervisor of OMB itself. It also set out a number of 
principles and proposals for regulatory reform.65 In essence, however, the Bush Administration 
followed the basic approach of its predecessor, with OMB review remaining under the two 
Reagan executive orders.  
Cost-benefit balancing had been highly controversial when conducted by Republican 
administrations. For this reason, it was uncertain whether President Clinton would allow it to 
continue to play a role within the executive branch. But in a significant and dramatic step, 
President Clinton endorsed the essential features of the Reagan-Bush orders in his Executive 
Order 12,866.66 The crucial point about Clinton’s order is that it accepted the basic commitments 
of the two Reagan-Bush orders, by requiring agencies to assess both costs and benefits and to 
proceed only when the latter justified the former. At the same time, President Clinton offered 
several changes to the Reagan-Bush processes, mainly attempting to create assurances against 
the fear of industry capture of the system of review. First, he attempted to diminish public 
concerns about interest-group power over regulation, by providing a process to resolve conflicts 
and procedures for greater openness.67 Second, he included references to “equity,” to 
“distributive impacts,” and to qualitative as well as quantitative factors, evidently so as to ensure 
that agencies could make adjustments in the process of decision, and abandon the cost-benefit 
assessment where this seems sensible.68 Third, President Clinton moved, in a modest but 
important way, toward including independent agencies within the executive orders. He did so by 
requiring the participation of the independent agencies within the unified regulatory agenda69 and 
also by requiring independent agencies to submit their proposals for inclusion within the annual 
                                                 
64 See Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Government, April 1, 1990-
March 31, 1991 5 (1990). Another very different innovation that occurred under the first President Bush was the 
active promotion of market-based approaches for protecting the environment--the most notable example being the 
acid rain allowance-trading program, which was the crown jewel of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. For an 
evaluation of this program, see A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets for Clean Air (2000). 
65 See id. 
66 Id. at (1994). 
67 See id. ] 
68 Id. at  
69 Id., at §(4)(b). 
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regulatory plan, allowing the Vice President an opportunity to advise and consult.70 We will 
build on these initiatives here. 
Congress has been slower to support efforts to require the balancing of benefits and costs 
of major regulations. In 1982 the Senate unanimously passed such a law, but it was defeated in 
the House of Representatives.71 Two primary environmental statutes that allowed the balancing 
of benefits and costs prior to the mid-1990s are the Toxic Substances Control Act72 and the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.73 Recently, Congress has shown greater 
interest in emphasizing the balancing of benefits and costs. Table 2 reviews recent regulatory 
reform initiatives, which could help improve regulation and legislation. The table suggests that 
Congress now shares the concern of the executive branch that the regulatory system is in need of 
repair and could benefit from more in the way of economic analysis.74 All reforms highlighted in 
the table emphasize a trend towards considering the benefits and costs of regulation, although the 
effectiveness of the provisions remains unclear. Perhaps because of the politicized nature of the 
debate over regulatory reform, these reform efforts have come about in a piecemeal fashion, and 













                                                 
70 Id. at § 4(c). 
71 Id.  
72 See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994) (describing an allowed balancing of “risk of injury to health or the environment”). 
73 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994) (allowing regulation to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment). 
74 Robert W. Crandall et al., An Agenda for Federal Regulatory Reform 3 (1997) (noting that “recent legislative 
debates masked a broad consensus among knowledgeable observers on the need for regulatory reform”). 
75 There has been some recent interest in Congress in reducing this overlap by establishing a single congressional 
agency that would have the responsibility for assessing the government regulation. This agency would be similar to 
the Congressional Budget Office, but it would have responsibility for regulation. In principle, such an agency could 
help stimulate better analysis and review of agency rules by providing an additional source of information. See 
Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, “Joint Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs,” U.S. Senate, 









Table 2: Recent Regulatory Reform Initiatives76 
Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act of 1995 
CBO is required to estimate the costs of laws with 
new mandates in excess of $50 million in any one 
year on state, local, and tribal governments, and 
in excess of $100 million in any one year on the 
private sector. Likewise, an executive branch 
agency must prepare a cost-benefit analysis of 
regulations with new mandates in excess of $100 
million in any one year on state, local, and tribal 
governments or the private sector. The agency is 
required to choose the “least costly, most cost-
effective, or least burdensome alternative,” unless 
the provisions are inconsistent with law or the 
head of an agency can explain why such an 
alternative was not adopted. 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996 
An agency must submit each final regulation and 
the supporting analyses to Congress and the 
General Accounting Office. Congress has at least 
sixty calendar days to review major regulations 
before they can become effective. During that 
time, Congress can enact a joint resolution of 
disapproval that, if passed and then signed by the 
president, would void the regulation. In addition, 
strengthened judicial review provisions hold 
agencies more accountable for the impacts of 
regulations on small entities.  
Regulatory Accountability Provision of 
1996, 1997, and 1998  
In separate appropriations legislation in 1996, 
1997, and 1998, Congress required the Office of 
Management and Budget to submit an assessment 
of the annual benefits and costs of all existing 
federal regulatory programs to Congress for 1997, 
1998, and 2000, respectively. The Office of 
Management and Budget already must review 
and approve analyses submitted by agencies 
estimating the costs and benefits of major 
                                                 
76 See Robert W. Crandall et al. An Agenda for Federal Regulatory Reform, 10-11 (1997); Robert W. Hahn, The 




proposed rules. The annual report provisions 
build on this review process. 
Pipeline Safety and Partnership 
Act of 1995 
The Secretary of Transportation must issue a 
pipeline standard “only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended 
standard justify its costs.” 
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 This Act eliminates the Delaney Clause for 
pesticides that set a zero-tolerance standard for 
carcinogens from residues in processed foods. In 
setting standards for raw or processed foods, the 
EPA will now establish a tolerance level to 
ensure “a reasonable certainty of no harm” from 
pesticide residues. For pesticide products that 
exceed that negligible risk, the EPA may consider 
the benefits of the pesticide to justify granting a 
tolerance. 
Safe Drinking Water Act 
Amendments of 1996 
Under the original act, the maximum contaminant 
level (MCL) was to be 
set as close to the maximum contaminant level 
goal as “feasible.” Feasible was defined as using 
the best technology available “taking costs into 
consideration.” Under the new act, the EPA 
administrator “shall publish a determination as to 
whether the benefits of the MCL justify, or do not 
justify, the costs.” 
Truth in Regulating Act of 1999  Establishes a three-year pilot program under 
which individual agency Regulatory Impact 
Analyses are subject to independent evaluation by 
GAO, upon request by Congress. 
Biennial Review Provision of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
Requires Federal Communications Commission: 
(1) to review biennially its regulations pertaining 
to telecommunications service providers and 
broadcast ownership; and (2) to determine 
whether economic competition has made those 
regulations no longer necessary in the public 
interest. 
 
     Courts, too, have shown interest in cost-benefit principles, developing a set of default rules 
that authorize agencies to minimize costs and maximize benefits, in the face of statutory 
ambiguity. Consider the following principles,77 all with support in the cases. Unless Congress 
has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to make de minimis exceptions to statutory 
                                                 
77 For a more detailed discussion of these principles, see Cass R. Sunstein, “Cost-Benefit Default Principles,” 99 
Mich L Rev 1651 (2001). 
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requirements by exempting small risks from regulatory controls.78 Unless Congress has clearly 
said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to balance the health risks created by regulation 
against the health benefits created by regulation.79 Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, 
agencies will be permitted to take costs into account in issuing regulations. In its current form, 
this principle means that where statutes are ambiguous, agencies will have the authority to 
consider costs as well as benefits.80 Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be 
permitted to decline to regulate past the point where regulation would be economically or 
technologically feasible.81 Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be expected 
to balance costs against benefits in issuing regulations.82  
These principles give the executive branch a great deal of room to maneuver because they 
authorize agencies, when so inclined, to move regulation in more cost-beneficial directions. We 
will draw on some of these principles in the discussion to follow. 
 
C. The Record 
One of the basic motivations for reforming the regulatory process is that with sensible 
reforms, regulators should be able to achieve what everyone would consider to be better social 
outcomes at lower cost. Table 3 provides that motivation by showing the cost per statistical life 
saved for a number of final regulations at the Environmental Protection Agency from 1986 to 
1994. We acknowledge that tables of this kind cannot tell us everything that we need to know 
about regulation;83 but we believe that enormous disparities of this sort are enough to create a 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., Coalition on Sensible Transportation, Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that, 
because “[e]valuating environmental effects of major road building projects ... is a long and arduous process,” in 
deciding whether statutory requirements have been met, a court cannot expect “perfection”)  
79 This principle appears to underlie American Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1052 (1999), which states that 
the “EPA must consider positive identifiable effects of a pollutant’s presence in the ambient air in formulating air 
quality criteria”). 
80 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (« [P]reclusion of cost consideration requires a rather 
express congressional direction. »). 
81 See Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Since we cannot discern clear congressional 
intent to preclude consideration of cost ... the Administrator may consider those factors.”) 
82 Competitive Enter. Inst. v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (remanding the case to NHTSA to make certain 
that “[w]hen the government regulates in a way that prices many of its citizens out of access to large-car safety … 
the affected citizens at least know that the government has faced up to the meaning of its choice.”. 
83 See Lisa Heinzerling, supra note 46, at 1998 (noting that a table calculating the costs of various regulations per 
life saved “is both over inclusive and under inclusive”). 
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strong presumption of irrationality and incoherence in regulation. In our view, no one has 
suggested a basis for rebutting that presumption.84 
                                                 
84 Indeed, Heinzerling’s own revised table suggests considerable irrationality and incoherence. See id. at 2039, tbl.3 
(recalculating estimates of the costs of various regulations per life saved). We will not engage Heinzerling’s general 




Table 3: Cost of Selected EPA Regulation Per Statistical Life Saved85 
 
 
Environmental Protection Agency Regulation 
 
Year 
Net Cost per Discounted 
Statistical Life  
(millions of 2000 dollars) 
Toxicity characteristics to determine hazardous wastes 
 
Underground storage tanks: technical requirements 
 
Asbestos prohibitions: manufacture, importation, 
processing and distribution in commerce (total) 
 
National primary and secondary water regulations––
Phase II: MCLs for 38 contaminants 
 
Hazardous waste management system––wood 
preservatives 
 
Sewage sludge use and disposal regulations, 40 C.F.R. 
Part 503 
 
Land disposal restrictions for “third third” scheduled 
waste 
 
Hazardous waste management system: final solvents 
and dioxins land disposal restrictions rule 
 
Prohibition on land disposal of first third of scheduled 
wastes (“second sixth” proposal) 
 
Land disposal restrictions, Phase II: universal treatment 
standards and treatment standards for organic toxicity, 
characteristic wastes, and newly listed wastes 
 




Solid waste disposal facility criteria, 40 C.F.R. Parts 




































































                                                 
85 Robert W. Hahn, Randall W. Lutter, and Kip Viscusi, Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? (2000) (visited 
February 11, 2002) http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/books/hlv.pdf. Numbers updated from 1995 dollars 




There are two key points to note from this table. First, the cost per statistical life saved 
spans an extraordinarily wide range–from $9 billion to over $40 billion. Second, there are ample 
opportunities to save more lives at less cost, simply because of these significant differences in 
the cost per statistical life saved. Taking advantage of these opportunities would require 
reallocating expenditures away from those regulations that are least cost-effective and toward 
those regulations that are most cost-effective.86 The consensus among those who study this area 
is that there is great potential to develop regulations that achieve social objectives at lower cost 
because of the differences in cost-effectiveness among regulations aimed at achieving the same 
(or similar) objectives. Note that OIRA appears to agree, having urged a number of new 
initiatives via the new institution of the “prompt letter,” taken up below.87 
 Unfortunately, no institution in the federal government now has, as its primary aim, the 
goal of targeting regulatory expenditures to their best uses.88 Instead, the primary instrument 
used to review the effectiveness of federal regulations is the regulatory oversight required by the 
executive orders discussed above. For the most part, this oversight occurs on a regulation-by-
regulation basis.89 OMB’s job consists of meeting with officials and reviewing each Regulatory 
Impact Analysis (“RIA”) that is prepared for economically significant regulations.90 Each RIA 
                                                 
86 There is a long literature on this subject. For analysis by one of the first to make this point, see John F. Morrall, A 
Review of the Record, 10 Reg. Nov./Dec. 1986 at 25-34. For subsequent efforts, see, e.g., Robert W. Hahn, 
“Regulatory Reform: What do the Government’s Numbers Tell Us?”, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved 208-253 
(Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996); Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall, Health and Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate 
Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. Risk Uncertainty 43-66 (1994);; Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, “The 
Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments,” in Life-Saving, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved 167-182 
(Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996); Indur M. Goklany, Rationing Health Care While Writing Blank Checks for 
Environmental Hazards, 15 Reg. Summer 1992 at 14. For a critique of this approach, and of Morrall’s in particular, 
see Heinzerling, supra note 46. 
87 See infra at Part II.B. 
88 Stephen Breyer makes this point and suggests “establishment of new career path that would provide a group of 
civil servants with experience in health and environmental agencies, Congress, and OMB.” Breyer, supra note 8, at 
60.  
89 Executive Order 12,866 does direct the Vice President to conduct a yearly meeting with agency heads “to seek a 
common understanding of priorities and to coordinate regulatory efforts to be accomplished in the upcoming year.” 
Executive Order 12866 , supra note 3, at Each agency is also required to submit to OMB: a unified regulatory 
agenda, which describes all regulations under development or review; a regulatory plan, which describes “the most 
important significant regulatory actions that the agency reasonably expects to issue in proposed or final form in that 
fiscal year or thereafter.” Id.. 
90 The Executive Orders require that the RIA be prepared. Agencies generally do such a regulatory analysis for each 
economically significant rule whose annual impact on the economy exceeds $100 million. Typically, the agency 
proposing the regulation performs the regulatory impact analysis, often with the help of outside consultants. The 
analysis is supposed to include a statement of the potential need for the proposal, an examination of alternative 
approaches, an assessment of benefits and costs, the rationale for choosing the proposed regulatory action, and a 
statement of statutory authority. 
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provides a rich source of data for examining the costs and benefits of regulation as well as the 
cost-effectiveness of selected regulations.  
How has the process worked in practice? Our basic answer, documented below, is that 
the process has not worked extremely well. Unfortunately, it is difficult to gauge the 
effectiveness of federal executive regulatory oversight and the executive orders themselves. The 
basic problem is that we have very few natural experiments that provide useful information. One 
of the present authors used a data set and found that the introduction of OIRA did not appear to 
affect the cost-effectiveness of regulations, contrary to his hypothesis.91 He is reluctant to 
conclude, however, that OIRA does not have an effect.92 Farrow used a similar data set, but 
included regulations that are rejected as well as those that are finalized. He found that the cost-
effectiveness of a rule does not have a large impact on the decision to reject or accept that rule.93 
Farrow argued that this provides evidence that OIRA has not had an impact, at least as measured 
in terms of improvements in cost-effectiveness for those rules that are accepted.94  Eric Posner 
reaches similar conclusions, urging that cost-benefit review is less a tool for improving 
regulation than for increasing presidential control over agencies.95 
 Another way of gauging the effectiveness of regulatory oversight is to measure the 
quality of each RIA itself. The information provided in an RIA is often badly incomplete, and the 
level of detail and analytical sophistication varies across agencies and types of regulations.96 In 
some cases the most basic information, about both benefits and costs, is missing. Common 
deficiencies include inadequate consideration of alternatives, poor treatment of uncertainty, 
incomplete estimation of benefits and costs, as well as various methodological errors.97 
                                                 
91 See Robert Hahn, Reviving Regulatory Reform 52 (2000).  
92 One problem with the data is that they do not directly measure any impact that OIRA might have had on changing 
the cost-effectiveness of particular regulations, which is one of OIRA’s important functions. Hahn explains that the 
insignificance of OIRA’s effect on cost-effectiveness may be due to: a lack of data in the pre-OIRA period; the fact 
that few rules were proposed or finalized following OIRA’s creation; and the methodological problem of measuring 
OIRA’s effect on unobservable, but important factors, like other bureaucrats’ treatment of potential regulations. Id.. 
93 Farrow finds that (the logarithm of) cost-per-life saved is significant but that “it may not be policy significant as 
cost per life saved must increase by very large amounts in order to change the probability of rejection by a large 
factor.” Farrow, supra note 15, at 22.  
94 Farrow finds that “The suggested impact of OIRA is either not to change or to increase the estimated cost-per-life-
saved between the proposed and final rule,” and that in general, OIRA does not impact cost-effectiveness. Id. at 23. 
95 See Posner, supra note 4. 
96 Hahn, supra note 72, at 212-14 (describing the discrepancies in RIAs across agencies); Richard D. Morgenstern & 
Marc K. Landy, Economic Analysis: Benefits, Costs, Implications, in Economic Analysis at EPA (Richard D. 
Morgenstern ed., 1999).  
97 Agencies do not always indicate the year in which specified benefits and costs apply. Agencies may show such 
information only in particular years instead of presenting full streams of benefits and costs. Perhaps most 
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Moreover, different assumptions are applied across regulations.98 Indeed, comprehensive 
analyses of the RIAs suggest that they lack analytical consistency and that agencies only 
superficially comply with the requirements in the Reagan and Clinton executive orders. A study 
of forty-eight major health, safety, and environmental regulations from mid-1996 to mid-1999 
provided evidence that agencies generally failed to comply with the executive order and adhere 
to the OMB guidelines.99  
 From an evaluation of the record on executive regulatory oversight, we conclude that the 
commitment to cost-benefit analysis is as much symbolic as real. There is not strong evidence 
that the Executive Orders or the oversight process has made a substantial difference in policy 
outcomes. Moreover, there is evidence that the cost-benefit analyses included as part of the 
regulatory oversight process suffer from serious flaws. 
 
III. Proposed Innovations 
The major goal of our proposed executive order is to deepen and widen the commitment 
to cost-benefit analysis. We propose to strengthen the role of OIRA, to offer stricter and clearer 
principles and requirements, and to ensure a more transparent, coherent, and uniform process at 
the agency level. We also propose to include the independent agencies within the process of 
OIRA review. As we shall emphasize, an executive order, by itself, will not do a great deal to 
change the system of regulation. As suggested by the record of the last two decades, everything 
depends on matters of implementation. But a new order would itself be a strong signal of a new 
commitment both to cost-benefit balancing and to OIRA; and the suggested innovations would, 
we believe, hold out considerable promise for improving the situation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
importantly, in many cases the agency did not complete its quantitative analysis of benefits or cost savings. See 
Hahn, supra note 72, at 212-14. 
98 For an analysis of the sensitivity of net benefit calculations to discount rate and benefit valuation assumptions, see 
id. See also Matthew Adler & Eric Posner, Implementing Cost Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, in 
Cost Benefit Analysis 269, 310 (Matthew Adler & Eric Posner eds., 2001) (listing valuations of life given by various 
administrative agencies). Agency practices are variable with respect to the discount rate, see id. at 311, and these 
variations can create significant differences in otherwise similar rules. Some of the variations are extremely hard to 
defend. 
99 See Hahn et al., supra note 4. In a comprehensive evaluation of a detailed data set, the authors found that 
agencies’ economic analyses typically do not provide enough information to make decisions that will maximize the 
efficiency or effectiveness of a rule. For a majority of the rules, agencies failed to quantify net benefits, discuss 
alternatives, or quantify costs and benefits of alternatives.  
For OMB guidelines, which comprise a set of principles for improving regulatory analysis and making the 




A. Promoting Compliance 
We have seen that the track record on compliance with regulatory oversight requirements 
is much less than stellar.100 There is no simple solution for the compliance problem. Political will 
on the part of high-level officials is a key component, but even with political will, agencies might 
be able to act strategically and game the system. 
Keeping these points in mind, we offer two suggestions for compliance: First, OMB 
should issue a modified set of guidelines on how to perform the analysis that is required in the 
RIA and on how to evaluate that analysis before it is submitted to OMB. If these guidelines are 
not met, then the proposed regulation should be returned to the agency until the analysis meets 
OMB’s guidelines. Second, for important regulations, OIRA should work with the agency to 
agree on a set of key assumptions and alternatives to be used in the analysis.101 If the terms of 
this agreement are violated, then OIRA can elect to return the proposed regulation.102 In our 
approach, the guidelines would have a far more prominent place than they now do. For this 
reason, we think that the guidelines should be subject to public review and comment before they 
are finalized. The ordinary process, for notice and comment via the Federal Register, should 
suffice here, as elsewhere.103 
                                                                                                                                                             
Affairs. M-00-08, Guidelines to Standardize Measures of Costs and Benefits and the Format of Accounting 
Statements (2000) available at http:www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport1998.pdf. 
100 See General Accounting Office, Regulatory Reform: Agencies Could Improve Development, Documentation, and 
Clarity of Regulatory Economic Analyses (1998) at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98142.pdf (reporting that 
significant number of agencies’ economic analyses “did not incorporate the best practices set forth in OMB’s 
guidance”). For a comparison of state and federal regulatory oversight initiatives, see Robert W. Hahn, State and 
Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J. Legal Studies 873 (2000). 
101 For a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of early OMB review of regulatory initiatives, see Christopher C. 
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, “White House Review of Agency Rulemaking,” 99 Harv. L. Rev.. 1075, 1080 
(1986). 
102 See Richard Belzer, Comments on Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation 
(2001). Belzer notes that agencies’ “regulatory impact analyses fall short in part because OMB’s oversight occurs 
too late to secure timely methodological corrections.” Belzer suggests that before work on an RIA begins, agencies 
should be required to consult with OMB and to agree upon the key assumptions, parameters, and components of the 
analysis. He suggests that the protocol that is developed should be subject to public comment and review. He does 
not, however, suggest an enforcement mechanism. One possibility would be for OMB to return a rule if the terms of 
the agreement are not met. We think this approach should be tried on an experimental basis at first. We are 
concerned, among other things, how new knowledge could be incorporated into the decision making process. See, 
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, “The Arithmetic of Arsenic,” Geo. L. J. (forthcoming 2002), and problems associated with 
our evolving understanding of arsenic. 
103 There are some legal issues here that we will not address in detail. OMB appears to lack the statutory authority to 
make rules and regulations governing federal regulation. On the other hand, the President has the standard authority, 
via executive order, to issue binding principles. For a general discussion, see Elena Kagan, “Presidential 
Administration,” 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2319-2331 (2001). If the President has that authority, he also has the 
authority to delegate that power to the Director of OMB, at least if he does so expressly via executive order. 
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In terms of substance, the most recent guidelines issued by OMB represent a good start, 
but we would go further.104 Specifically, the following steps would increase transparency in the 
regulatory process and improve the quality of regulatory analysis. With the exception of the last 
step, we have not listed them in the Executive Order itself, on the theory that they are too 
specific and detailed to belong there. We believe, however, that OMB should require such steps: 
1. Agencies should post each regulatory impact analysis and supporting documents on the 
Internet before a draft proposed or final regulation can be considered in the regulatory review 
process; 
2. Agency analyses should include a clear, brief executive summary (no more than one 
page) that contains information on costs, benefits, and technical information, and that says 
whether the best estimate of quantifiable benefits associated with the regulation is likely to 
exceed the best estimate of associated costs, and whether it can be expected to maximize net 
benefits.105 A summary of key aspects of the regulation should be included in a table at the 
beginning of each RIA.106 Table 4 provides an example of a summary table. This table could 
promote accountability by allowing OMB and other interested parties to evaluate how well 
agencies are doing in reporting different kinds of information.  
                                                 
104 For the most recent OMB guidelines, see Office of Management and Budget, supra note 84. In OMB’s draft 
review on benefits and costs in 1999, several other possible reforms are discussed, including a proposal to ensure 
that agencies obtain independent, external peer-review of regulatory analyses “in order to identify areas that need 
improvement and stimulate the development of better estimation techniques more useful for assessing existing 
regulations.” OMB, supra note 84. This is probably a good idea if the peer reviewers are chosen independently and 
are motivated to spend the time to do a good job. For some of the problems with peer review, see Linda Cohen & 
Robert Hahn, A Solution to Concerns over Public Access to Scientific Data, 285 Science 535 (1999). 
105 Some discussion of the net benefits of reasonable alternatives should also be included. The guidelines currently 
specify that analyses should “present a summary of the benefit and cost estimates for each alternative and provide a 
clear statement of the effects in a form that is easily usable by other readers of the rule.” Office of Management and 
Budget, supra note 84, at 3.  
106 For an example of a standardized format that could be used to report and summarize regulatory information, see 
Robert W. Hahn, “How Changes in the Federal Register Can Help Improve Regulatory Accountability,” 52 Admin. 
L. Rev. 927, 951-952 (2000). The regulatory summaries could provide very useful information to OMB in preparing 
its annual report on regulation. Specifically, it would enable OMB to provide some quantitative analysis of the  
extent to which various agencies were complying with its guidelines and doing good RIAs. In addition, it would be a 




Regulatory Impact Summary 
I. BACKGROUND ON RULE AND AGENCY 
AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT/OFFICE NAME 
CONTACT PERSON TELEPHONE NUMBER 
TITLE OF THE RULE 
RIN NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER 
TYPE OF RULEMAKING 
(FINAL/INTERIM/PROPOSED/NOTICE) 
 
TYPE OF RULE 
(REGULATORY/BUDGET IMPACT) 




BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE RULE 
II. OVERALL IMPACT 
1. Will the rule have an impact on the economy of $100 million or more? Yes     No  
2. Best estimate of the present value of quantifiable benefits of the rule. $________ 
3. Best estimate of the present value of quantifiable costs of the rule.107 $________ 
4. Do the quantifiable benefits exceed the quantifiable costs?           Yes     No  
5. Report the dollar year of costs and benefits._______________________________ 
6. Report the discount rate used in the calculations for costs and benefits._________ 
7. If more than one discount rate was used in calculations, please explain why. ____ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
8. Discuss level of confidence in the benefit-cost estimates and key uncertainties. 









                                                 
107 Costs are defined as costs minus cost savings. 
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III. COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Estimated Incremental Costs 
1. Costs and breakdown of quantifiable costs by type. 
 Annual Years in Which Present Value 
  Costs Occur 
Total Costs _________ _________ _________ 
Compliance Costs _________ _________ _________ 
Administrative Costs _________ _________ _________ 
Federal Budget Costs _________ _________ _________ 
Local/State Budget Costs _________ _________ _________ 








Estimated Incremental Benefits 
1. Benefits and breakdown of quantifiable benefits by type. 
 Annual Years in Which Present Value 
  Benefits Occur  
Total Benefits _________ _________ _________ 
Health Benefits _________ _________ _________ 
Environmental Benefits _________ _________ _________ 
Other Benefits _________ _________ _________ 
Notes:__________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Give a brief description of who will benefit. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE REGULATION 
1. List and briefly describe the alternatives to the rule that were considered and why they 
were rejected, including a summary of costs and benefits of those alternatives. If no 














3. Agencies should be required to calculate the net benefits of a regulation based on the 
best available quantitative information.108  
4. Agencies should use some default assumptions for standard parameters in order to 
facilitate comparison within and across regulations. For example, OMB should specify a default 
discount rate along with a range. Similarly, OMB should specify the value of a quality-adjusted 
life year and appropriate ranges along with the value of a statistical life and ranges.109 We 
recognize that these values may, with good reason, differ across different regulations; 
nonetheless, there is also merit in having a methodology that is fairly standard. Agencies should 
be permitted to use alternative assumptions where they can provide a good rationale that has a 
basis in economics.110  
5. Each federal regulatory agency should be required to produce an annual report on the 
benefits and costs of regulatory activities. Requiring annual reports would make the regulatory 
process more transparent, and could improve estimates of the economic impact of regulatory 
activity. In addition, the agency reports would help the OMB produce its overall assessment of 
the impact of federal regulation. We add some details below.111 
 
B. Prompts and Returns 
Our Executive Order also gives an explicit place for the idea of “prompt letters,” an 
innovation introduced in the early months of the Bush Administration.112 To understand this 
idea, some brief background is in order. 
Throughout its history, OIRA’s basic mission has been to stop unjustified rules, mainly 
through the use of “return letters,” which require agencies to reconsider their proposals. Yet 
studies show that adding some regulations, while removing or improving others, could save tens 
                                                 
108 OMB guidelines assume that the agencies will calculate net benefits. They allude to net benefits in discussing the 
comparison of alternatives in explaining how to discount. They also say that cost-effectiveness can be used instead 
of net benefit calculations when necessary. The guidelines never say, however, that agencies must calculate net 
benefits. The sample chart provided by OMB in its guidelines, in which agencies would report summary information 
about a regulation, includes costs and benefits, but not net benefits. OMB 2000 Report Charts, supra note 8, at 4-5, 
7, 8, 19-20. 
109 These values could change over time as new knowledge accrues. 
110 Agencies should be required to use the standard assumptions, as well, for ease of comparison across regulations. 
111 See infra Appendix, § 5. 




of thousands of lives and millions of dollars annually.113 An important priority for the future is to 
redesign existing institutions and agencies by adding regulations that make sense, while reducing 
those that do not. One of our primary concerns is that no institution in government has yet 
vindicated the hopes of those who believed that cost-benefit analysis could be used to help 
promote better priority-setting, block senseless rules, and spur agency action when it is justified. 
In 2001, OIRA quietly announced a striking, if overdue, innovation: “prompt letters,” 
designed to encourage agencies to explore new areas in which regulation might deliver benefits 
that exceed costs.114 Not only did OIRA announce the use of prompt letters; it also issued two of 
them. One of those letters, to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), involved mandatory 
disclosure of trans-fatty acids in the Nutrition Facts panel of food.115 Drawing attention to 
evidence that trans-fatty acids contribute to coronary heart disease (“CHD”), the letter noted that 
a disclosure rule seemed to be supported by the FDA’s preliminary analysis, which estimated 
that, ten years after the effective date, the rule would prevent 7,600 to 17,100 cases of CHD and 
avert 2,500 to 5,600 deaths per year. Over a 20-year period, the FDA estimated the benefits of 
such a rule would range from $25 billion to $59 billion, while the costs would be $400 million to 
$850 million. The prompt letter strongly encouraged the FDA to issue a disclosure rule or to 
explain its failure to do so. 
The other prompt letter, involving automatic external defibrillators (“AEDs”), was sent to 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, with a firm request that the agency “consider 
whether promotion of AEDs should be elevated to a priority.”116 The letter referred to an 
editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, noting that only 2% to 5% of the 225,000 
persons who have sudden and unexpected cardiac arrest each year outside a hospital are 
successfully resuscitated compared to the 17% to 38% success rates found with AEDs. The 
prompt letter observed that “some preliminary cost-effectiveness calculations” showed that 
“AEDs in the workplace might prove to be a very cost-effective intervention.” 117 Indeed AEDs, 
now mandated on air carriers by the Department of Transportation, are estimated to save nine 
lives per year, at the comparatively low price of $2.4 million in annual costs. The prompt letter 
                                                 
113 See supra note 16.. 
114 Office of Management and Budget, News Release, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2001-35.html 
(Sept. 18, 2001) 
115 Id. 




suggested that OSHA should consider following the Department of Transportation’s lead. OIRA 
has issued a series of prompt letters since the initial announcement, including a letter to the 
Department of Transportation and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regarding 
frontal offset crash testing, and a letter to the Environmental Protection Agency regarding 
particulate matter.118 
In our view, these “prompt letters” are an exceedingly important development. For far too 
long, the idea of cost-benefit analysis has been wrongly associated with dogmatic opposition to 
regulation. To be sure, an exploration of costs and benefits often shows that regulation cannot be 
justified. But cost-benefit analyses can show, and have shown, that government action is 
worthwhile––and indeed that government should do more. Such analyses helped encourage 
policymakers to remove lead from gasoline and protect the ozone layer.119 Prompt letters 
promise to strengthen the hand of policy analysts in the federal government, ensuring that action 
will be taken on the basis of a careful assessment of consequences, rather than in reaction to 
interest groups or political platitudes.  
But why––it might be asked––should prompt letters be made public? Shouldn’t such 
letters be part of the informal, behind-the-scenes consultation that often occurs within the 
executive branch? This is not a simple question to answer, but in some ways public disclosure of 
prompt letters is a great virtue. Public disclosure promotes transparency and hence 
accountability. Equally important, public disclosure increases the likelihood that OIRA’s 
concerns will be taken seriously. In the end, agencies remain in charge of their own priorities; 
but if OIRA’s suggestion is reasonable, public disclosure will give agencies an additional reason 
to investigate it with care. 
It would be desirable in this regard for independent groups to play a role in 
recommending prompt letters. OIRA’s own resources are far too limited to enable it to consider 
all promising possibilities on its own.120 Environmental groups, for example, might conduct their 
own analyses to suggest that new steps ought to be taken to control certain pollutants. Institutions 
that investigate regulatory issues, and even individual observers from academia and elsewhere, 
might be provided with a forum by which they could suggest a prompt letter from OIRA. The 
supporting analysis might be developed privately and reviewed publicly. Steps of this sort might 
                                                 
118 Supra note 108. 
119 Economic Analysis at EPA, supra note 44. 
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simultaneously increase the quality of analysis and the level of public participation in the 
regulatory process. 
In our proposed order, we have also given an explicit place to the idea of “return letters.” 
Not only did OIRA announce the use of prompt letters; it also issued four of them. But the 
practice of returning regulations lay dormant during the last years of the Clinton 
Administration,121 and there is some value in making the power explicit, if only to give a clear 
signal that it should be exercised in appropriate circumstances. 
 
C. De Minimis Exceptions, Substitute Risks, Equity, and Distribution 
We have introduced two new principles, implicit in previous orders but deserving explicit 
recognition. We have also recast the treatment of equity and distributional effects. 
1. De Minimis Exceptions. In a series of cases, courts have authorized agencies to exempt 
trivial risks from regulation, at least when Congress has not unambiguously denied agencies that 
authority.122 This principle is a modern version of an ancient idea: de minimis non curat lex. In 
the regulatory context, the principle has special importance. When risks are trivial, it is not likely 
to be worthwhile to eliminate them, partly because the effort distracts attention from more 
serious problems, partly because of the sheer expense of the effort. We have built the de minimis 
principle into the executive order, asking agencies not to deal with trivial problems. 
2. Substitute Risks. The last decade has seen increasing attention devoted to the 
possibility that risk regulation will produce substitute risks.123 It is well known that fuel economy 
standards for new cars could result in the production of smaller and less safe vehicles; whatever 
the extent of this danger, we think it reasonable for government to take steps to avoid it. In the 
context of the EPA’s ozone standard, it was successfully urged that EPA should consider the 
possibility that regulation of ground-level ozone could actually increase health risks, by 
                                                                                                                                                             
120 See note supra. 
121 There were no return letters in the last three years of the Clinton Administration. See John Graham, Presidential 
Management of the Regulatory State (2001) available at  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/graham_speech121701.html (Dec. 17, 2001). 
122 See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F. 2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Unless Congress has been 
extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis for an implication of de minimis authority to provide exemption when the 
burdens of regulation yield a gain of trivial or no value.”). 
123 See Graham & Weiner, supra note 18, at 25 (defining the term “risk substitution”). 
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increasing cataracts and skin cancers.124 Indeed, courts appear to be creating a new default 
principle, authorizing agencies to take account of the substitute risks introduced by regulation. 
The general problem is ubiquitous, and agencies should take corrective steps. We have built into 
the executive order a specific requirement that agencies attend to the problem. 
3. Equity and Distribution. We propose to allow agencies to consider the distributional 
effects of regulation, and to proceed if an understanding of those effects justifies a departure 
from the “bottom line” produced by cost-benefit calculations. This is a departure from the 
Reagan Order, which offered no reference to distributive effects.125 At the same time, we require 
agencies to offer a detailed explanation for proceeding if the costs significantly exceed the 
benefits. This is a departure from the Clinton Order, which provided somewhat vague references 
to both “equity” and “distributive impacts.”126 To understand these points, some background is in 
order. 
      A conventional objection to cost-benefit analysis is that it treats society as if it were an 
individual person, and disregards the fact that a regulation typically produces both winners and 
losers. Suppose, for example, that the costs of stricter controls on particulates are $500 million 
annually, and that the benefits are $350 million. Does this mean that the stricter controls are a 
bad idea? This is not so clear. Skeptics might urge that we need to know far more about the 
identity of the winners and the losers. Does the $500 million cost mean that corporate profits will 
decline, so that high-level corporate officials will have reduced salaries? Does it mean that prices 
will increase, and if so, are luxury items involved? Will the $350 million in benefits be enjoyed 
mostly by poor people? By children? Of course a measurement of benefits in terms of “life 
years” would automatically extend special concern to children. Or by people who are elderly and 
already well off? Critics of cost-benefit analysis believe that in order to know whether to 
proceed, it is crucial not simply to tabulate both costs and benefits, but to ask and answer such 
questions. 
      Such critics have a point, but there are many complexities here. In some cases, those who 
benefit from regulation are the same as those who must pay for it, and hence questions of this 
kind need not arise. The EPA’s decision to regulate arsenic in drinking water is a recent 
                                                 
124 See Am. Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussing the risks of varying levels of 
stratospheric versus tropospheric ozone). 
125 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 1. 
126 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 2 
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example.127 Often, of course, those who gain are not the same as those who lose. But it is wrong 
to think, as some people seem to do, that regulation typically imposes costs on wealthy 
corporations and delivers benefits to those in need––and hence that cost-benefit analysis is an 
unfortunate method for blocking desirable redistribution. The basic reason is that regulation is a 
crude and often ineffective tool for redistributing resources.128 If, for example, high costs are 
imposed on those who buy automobiles or gasoline, the victims will not be some abstractions 
called “corporations.” On the contrary, it is highly likely that the costs will be felt by some 
combination of consumers (with price increases being especially hard on the poor), workers who 
must face lower wages, and people who are thrown into unemployment. And when regulation 
provides benefits, there is no general reason to think that low-income people will be the 
beneficiaries. In short, the incidence of regulatory benefits and burdens is not easy to untangle 
and the burdens are likely to be felt by real people, many of them far from wealthy. All that can 
be said for certain is that regulation is most unlikely to transfer resources from those who are 
well off to those who are needy.129 
       Invoking considerations of this kind, some people urge that cost-benefit analysis should be 
the exclusive basis for regulation, and that equity and distributional effects are all too likely to be 
used as an all-purpose basis for assistance not to those who are needy, but to powerful private 
groups.130 But we do not favor going so far as to bar consideration of distributive effects. We do 
believe that the idea of “equity” is too vague to be helpful; but in our view, agencies should be 
permitted to take account of distributive effects. Certainly they should do so when the context 
suggests that the benefits will go to people who are especially needy, and that the burdens will be 
imposed on people who can easily bear them––and also when the burdens would be imposed on 
the needy and the benefits enjoyed by those who are already very well off. Consider, for 
example, the fact that poor people have been the disproportionate winners from regulation of air 
                                                 
127 See Cass R. Sunstein, “The Arithmetic of Arsenic,” Georgetown Law Journal (?) (forthcoming 2002). 
128 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, “An Introduction to Law and Economics,” 7-10, 119-120 (1983). and Arrow et 
al., supra note 9, at 4 (“Too frequently, environmental, health and safety regulation has used a one-size-fits-all or 
command-control approach.”). 
129 Indeed, regulation that is defended on equitable grounds sometimes turns out, in practice, to benefit powerful 
private groups with no special claim to governmental assistance. See James Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, 
Calculating Risks 1(2000) (examining “risk measures to cost data to derive estimates of Superfund site 
remediations” in hazardous waste clean-up projects). 
130 The argument for cost-benefit analysis alone might be supported by noting that a uniform number for mortality 
and morbidity risks already contains a redistributive element, since it uses the same figure for wealthy and poor 
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pollution.131 Consider also the fact that the burdens of stringent regulation of arsenic in drinking 
water are likely to be borne disproportionately by those who are relatively less well off.132 
Though good data will often be absent, agencies should consider effects of this sort. 
When the costs are far higher than the benefits, however, agencies should not allow 
distributive effects to be a kind of all-purpose justification for proceeding. Instead they should 
give a careful analysis of their approach. We believe that if the costs are grossly disproportionate 
to the benefits, there should be a strong presumption against regulation, rebuttable only in cases 
where the distributive argument is compelling. 
 
D. Requiring Explanation When Benefits Do Not Exceed Costs 
We believe that agencies should generally act only when the benefits exceed the costs. To 
be sure, this is not meant as a rigid requirement. Agencies should be permitted, in unusual 
circumstances, to act even when the numbers do not support their action. But in such cases, we 
ask an agency that chooses to proceed with a regulation that does not pass a cost-benefit test to 
provide a rationale for doing so. By “does not pass” a benefit-cost test, we mean that the 
expected quantifiable costs are likely to exceed the quantifiable expected benefits, before taking 
distributional effects and any other relevant factor into account. Of course there are typically 
large uncertainties in developing the relevant estimates, and hence a large number of 
discretionary judgments must be made before generating the numbers.133 We think that OIRA 
administrator should decide when a proposed regulation does not pass a cost-benefit test based 
on her best judgment. OIRA administrator should be reasonably confident that the quantified net 
benefits of the proposed regulation are negative before requiring a rationale. For example, a 
margin on the order of ten million dollars annually could be set as a minimum threshold. 
The agency head should be allowed to consider other relevant factors in her decision-
making, including distributional effects. These factors should be quantified to the extent 
possible, even if they are not included in the cost-benefit analysis itself. The purpose of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
people--despite the fact that willingness to pay is likely to vary with wealth. Of course, if willingness to pay does 
vary a narrowly defined cost-benefit analysis would take this into account.  
131 Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 Regulation 34 (2001). 
132 The arsenic rule provides an interesting case because the problem is often localized. In such cases, several 
authors have argued for local standards rather than national standards. See, e.g., Jason K. Burnett & Robert W. 
Hahn, “A Costly Benefit,” 24 Reg. Fall 2001, at 44; William A. Niskanen, “Arsenic and Old Facts,” 24 Reg. Fall 
2001, at 54. 
133 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, Geo. L. J. (forthcoming 2002). Arrow et al., supra note, at 6. 
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quantification is to make the analysis more transparent. We also believe that factors that cannot 
be easily be quantified should be factored into the analysis where relevant. In providing the 
rationale for proceeding, the agency head has an opportunity (and in our view, a duty) to provide 
a well-reasoned analytical justification for the decision reached. Requiring a rationale for 
proceeding when expected net benefits are negative will give the regulatory process more 
legitimacy, and should also lend legitimacy to the use of cost-benefit analysis as a tool for 
decision making. 
Suppose, for example, that a new regulation of a certain air pollutant would have 
monetized benefits of $250 million, but monetized costs of $280 million. Suppose, too, that the 
benefits would come in the form of reduced illnesses among young people, and also reduced 
mortality effects for people who would otherwise have many additional years. Suppose as well 
that many of the beneficiaries of the regulation are poor, and that the costs of the regulation 
would mainly result in higher prices for certain products (say, cars and energy). The problem is 
not entirely simple, especially because increased energy prices hit poor people hardest; but in 
this admittedly stylized example, an administrator might well be able to justify a decision to 
proceed even though the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits. 
 
E. Make Underlying Analysis Available 
There has been a controversy over public access to data used in regulatory decision-
making.134 The controversy arose when the Environmental Protection Agency finalized a 
regulation on particulate matter in July of 1997 that gave the agency new power to regulate a 
variety of emission sources ranging from power plants to lawn mowers and barbecues. The 
regulation, estimated to cost between 9 and 37 billion annually in 1990 dollars,135 was based 
partly on a study that suggested that reducing emissions of fine particles could lead to substantial 
reductions in premature mortality.136 In response to that controversy, Senator Richard Shelby 
                                                 
134 See Cohen & Hahn, supra note 99; Science, Technology and Law Program, The National Academies: Seeking 
Access to Research Data in the 21st Century: An Ongoing Dialogue Among Interested Parties (2001), at 
http://www4.nas.edu/pd/stl.nsf/web/data_access_workshop/; Michael Gough & Steven Milloy, The Case for Public 
Access to Federally Funded Research Data (2000), at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-366es.pdf; Angela Antonelli, 
Public Access to Research Data, Public Comment (1999), at  
http://www.heritage.org/library/testimony/comment091099.pdf.  
135 Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Particulate Matter and Ozone National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards and Proposed Regional Haze Rule (1997). Arrow et al., supra note, at 6. 
136 See Jocelyn Kaiser, 277 Science 467 (1997). 
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authored a provision in the 1999 Omnibus Spending Bill that requires data generated under 
federal awards at universities and non-profit institutions to be available to the public.137 OMB 
then developed a policy to implement the Shelby amendment.138 
 Our recommendation would go further than the Shelby amendment and would require 
the development of a new policy by OMB.139 As a presumption, all relevant information should 
be made available to the public regarding the derivation of the likely benefits and costs from 
regulations.140 OMB should address this issue through a policy in its guidelines to the agency (or 
in a separate policy statement). The primary purpose here is to promote transparency in the 
regulatory process, so the public and interested parties have better access to information that 
forms the basis for decision making.141 
 
F. Adopt An Annual Regulatory Plan and Retrospective 
      If OIRA becomes involved in the process only to approve or reject regulations, it will 
necessarily have a limited role. It would be highly desirable to create a process by which OIRA, 
and cost-benefit analysis, become relevant at an early stage. President Reagan attempted to move 
in this direction with his second executive order, which required agencies to produce an annual 
regulatory plan.142 President Clinton imposed similar requirements, though little was done with 
them in practice.143 A special advantage of this approach is that it promises to increase the 
authority of agency heads over their staffs, simply by ensuring that plans will be visible before 
the stage when they are practically final. 
Our proposal in this regard is simple and straightforward. We would require every agency 
to produce an account of its planned rules and to forward that account to OIRA, which would in 
                                                 
137 Id. 
138 OMB Circular A-110, which would permit requesters to be charged a fee for the data. Office of Management and 
Budget, Circular A-110 (1999), athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a110/a110.html. 
139 Our recommendation is similar to Hahn and Cohen’s recommendation concerning economically significant 
regulations, but moves beyond federally funded projects. See Cohen & Hahn, supra note 99. 
140 We are sensitive to the tradeoffs involved in the production of useful information, and, thus, would not require 
that all information necessarily be provided. For example, companies should not be required to make public 
proprietary information that would compromise their competitive position. In many cases, however, such data can 
be presented in a form that does not compromise a particular firm. The matter is somewhat more complicated for 
scholars. See Linda R. Cohen & Robert W. Hahn, Should Researchers Be Required to Share Data Used in 
Supporting Regulatory Decisions? (1999), at http://www.aei- 
brookings.org/publications/reganalyses/reg_analysis_99_01.pdf. 
141 For very significant decisions, say, involving billions of dollars annually, we think that interested parties should 
have access not only to data, but also to the models that generate key results. 
142 Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 2. 
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turn be authorized to work with the agency to require compliance with the principles and 
requirements of the executive order. By calling for OIRA participation, we hope to ensure more 
coordination at an early stage than was achieved under Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. 
 
G. Incorporating Independent Agencies 
We have urged that the process of OIRA review should be widened, to include the 
independent agencies as well as executive agencies and departments. As a matter of policy, the 
motivation for this suggestion is straightforward. Independent agencies qualify as such not 
because of the substance of what they do, but because Congress has chosen to limit the 
President’s power to remove their top officials––saying, in the typical formulation, that removal 
is acceptable only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”144 Many of the 
most important agencies in government are independent in this sense, including the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the National Labor Relations 
Board, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.  
      In principle, there is every reason to include independent agencies within the basic structure 
of an executive order on federal regulation. Indeed, the argument for including such agencies 
seems no weaker than the argument for including the conventional executive agencies. 
Moreover, as Table 5 shows, many of these agencies do not routinely quantify the benefits and 
costs of their proposed regulations, in part because they are not required to do so. If the goal is to 
ensure more rationality in regulation, and to devote resources to areas where they would do the 
most good, the independent agencies deserve inclusion no less than others. The real question is 
one of law, not of policy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
143 See Hahn et al., supra note 4 . 
144 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994) (concerning the FTC); 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (1994) (concerning the Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission). 
 Table 5: Federal Regulatory Agencies’ Efforts to Catalog Benefit and Cost Information145 
 
Agency Estimates of the Future Benefits and Costs of 
New Regulatory Activities 
Aggregate Estimates of the Benefits 
and Costs of Regulatory Activitiesa 
V. Executive Major Rulesb  Nonmajor 
Actionsc 
 
Department of Agriculture Partial  No evidence No 
Department of Commerced Partial  No evidence No 
Department of Energyd Partial  No evidence No 
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 
Partial  No evidence No 
Environmental Protection Agency Partial  Partial Partial 
Food and Drug Administration Partial  Partial No 
National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration 
Partial  Partial Partial 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration 
Partial  Partial No 
     
VI. Independent     
Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission 
 No  No 
Consumer Product Safety 
Commission 
 Partial  No 
Federal Communications Commission  No  No 
                                                 
145 Robert W. Hahn, Reviving Regulatory Reform: Global Perspective 62, tbls.3-11 (2000). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
       
39 
 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
 No  No 
Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission 
 Partial  No 
Federal Reserve Board  No  No 
Federal Trade Commission  No  No 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  Partial  No 
Securities and Exchange Commission  No  No 
Surface Transportation Boardd,e  No  No 
a. This category does not imply that an agency does not have enough information to estimate aggregate benefits and costs, but rather 
that an agency does not provide such information. For example, executive agencies may be able to put together a rough calculation 
of aggregate benefits and costs by compiling regulatory impact analysis estimates. 
b. All executive branch agencies are required to prepare regulatory impact analyses for major or economically significant rules. The 
analyses do not, however, always include comprehensive or complete estimates of benefits and costs. Hence, we characterize them 
as “partial.” 
c. Some agencies frequently estimate the benefits and costs of nonmajor actions. Unfortunately, my examination of the nonmajor 
universe is not exhaustive. Thus, we are not able to describe the size of the subset of nonmajor rules for which agencies have 
estimated benefits and costs. For other agencies, we have found no evidence that estimates are provided for nonmajor actions. 
d. We have relied primarily on Bliley (1997) for this agency. 
e. The Surface Transportation Board replaced the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1996.  
 Does the President have the legal authority to do what we propose? Though no 
President has tested the question, both the Department of Justice146 and the American Bar 
Association147 have concluded that he does. As a technical matter, the question remains 
unresolved. In the key case, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,148 the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutional legitimacy of the “independent” regulatory agencies, but it did 
not establish what, in particular, “independence” meant.149 Nothing in the Court’s opinion 
resolves the question of whether the President has supervisory authority over the 
independent agencies. As an initial matter, the question is one of statutory interpretation: 
What authority has Congress given to the President? 
We have noted that the members of independent agencies may be removed by the 
President, not at his will, but only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.”150 What do these terms mean? There are two possible approaches. On a narrow 
interpretation, the President is allowed to discharge independent agency heads only for 
grounds entirely unrelated to policy disagreements –-in which case the President may not 
supervise their policy choices. On this interpretation, the President may discharge people 
for corruption (“malfeasance in office”), for refusing to do their jobs (“neglect of duty”), 
or for more general dereliction in the sense of gross incompetence, chronic lateness, and 
the like (“inefficiency”). On this interpretation, application of the executive order to the 
independent agencies would indeed raise serious statutory questions. A process by which 
the President monitors such agencies for corruption and dereliction would be one thing; a 
process by which the President monitors such agencies for what he considers to be sound 
policy choices would be quite another. 
It is also important to take steps to ensure that existing regulations are subject to a 
process of continuing monitoring and oversight. We do not require any such steps in the 
proposed order itself, on the ground that they are best imposed by OMB in its general 
                                                 
146 See Peter Shane & Harold Bruff, The Law of Presidential Power: Cases and Materials 355-58 (1988). 
147 See Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, “The Role of the President and OMB in Informal 
Rulemaking,” 38 Admin. L. Rev. 181, app. (1986) (providing excerpts to this effect from a recommendation 
by the ABA’s Administrative Law Section and from a memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General 
for the Office of Legal Counsel). 
148 295 U.S. 602 (1935), 
149 The Court did suggest, in dicta, that there would be a great deal of practical independence , suggesting 
that the Federal Trade Commission is “independent of executive authority, except in its selection.” 295 U.S 
.at 625. This idea was followed in Borders v. Reagan, 518 F. Supp. 250, 260 (D. D.C. 1981), vacated as 
moot, 732 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1982), which involved President Reagan’s effort to remove a member of the 
District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Commission. 
150 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41; 29 U.S.C. § 661(b). 
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oversight function. But the key points are that prospective analysis of costs and 
benefits are often erroneous151 and that unanticipated developments can make regulations 
obsolete, too stringent, or insufficiently stringent.152 In order to assist OMB in its task of 
proposing an annual report of the costs and benefits of regulation, agencies should 
generate numbers reflecting their estimates of the effects of their own most significant 
regulations. In addition, a process should be instituted by each agency to give a 
retrospective analysis of some of its most costly regulations, to see what kinds of effects 
they are having in actual process. OIRA might work together with the relevant agencies 
to identify the best candidates for review. 
On the other hand, a broader interpretation of the statutory terms would hardly be 
impossible as a textual matter. The first point is that the narrow interpretation has the 
disadvantage of raising some unresolved constitutional problems. While the Court has 
upheld the idea of independent regulatory commissions,153 it has never held that Congress 
can entirely immunize such commissions from presidential oversight. To those who are 
skeptical of agency independence as a constitutional matter, the narrow interpretation 
would be extremely troubling and should be avoided if at all possible, so as to avoid a 
serious constitutional problem. The second point is that the relevant text is susceptible of 
a broader understanding. What counts as “inefficiency”? What counts as “neglect of 
duty”? At a minimum, it seems sensible to say that the President is entitled to require the 
production of documents to ensure that agency officials are acting efficiently and in a 
way that does not show neglect.154 To this extent, procedural incorporation of the 
independent agencies-–to require them to assess both costs and benefits-–seems to be on 
firm ground. And it would be reasonable to go further. If agencies proceed when the 
benefits do not exceed the costs, they might reasonably be thought to be acting 
“inefficiently” (pun intended), and in a way that shows a neglect of duty, at least if the 
decision to proceed is not adequately explained. A broader interpretation does not much 
stretch the language. 
                                                 
151 See note supra. 
152 See the catalogue of the inadequacies of prospective assessments in Bradley Karkkainen. See also 
Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson, “On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost 
Estimates,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 19, no. 2, 2000, 297-322. 
153 See Humphrey’s Executor, supra note 122 (rejecting a presidential removal of a member of the FTC); 
Mistretta v. US, 488 US 361, 410-12, pn 32-35 (1989). 
154 This point also follows from the Constitution’s Opinions in Writing Clause. See U.S. Const., art. 2, § 2. 
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None of this suggests that the President, or OIRA, should be permitted to displace 
the decisions of the independent regulatory agencies. But it does suggest that a 
supervisory role, leaving the ultimate decision to those agencies, would be entirely 
acceptable. To those who are skeptical of this conclusion, it might make sense to create a 
special, weaker system of oversight for the independent agencies, limited to procedural 
matters (and hence allowing no room for return letters). But we think that it would be 
desirable to keep a single system in place for all agencies, retaining the idea that if an 
independent agency ultimately seeks to issue a regulation notwithstanding OIRA 
objection, it is entitled to do so.155 
If our argument seems far-fetched, consider Bowsher v. Synar.156 In Bowsher, the 
Court struck down Congress’ effort to delegate discretionary authority to the Comptroller 
General.157 In so doing, the Court held that the Comptroller was unduly subject to 
congressional control, and thus operated as an agent of Congress, rather than as a 
genuinely independent agency.158 But what made the Comptroller an agent of Congress? 
The answer is the governing statute, which allows Congress to discharge the Comptroller 
for “inefficiency,” “neglect of duty,” or “malfeasance.”159 But on the narrow view, 
outlined above, these terms do not allow Congress much in the way of authority over the 
Comptroller. Rejecting the narrow view, the Court described these terms as “very broad” 
and suggested that they meant that Congress “in effect ... retained control over the 
execution of the Act....”160 In the Court’s view, these “very broad [terms] ... could sustain 
removal of a Comptroller General for any number of actual or perceived transgressions of 
the legislative will.”161 
It would be easy, even natural to take the Bowsher Court’s interpretation of the 
terms governing congressional removal of the Comptroller General as authority for the 
proper interpretation of the terms governing presidential removal of the members of 
independent regulatory commissions. This is so for a simple reason: the terms are very 
close, indeed essentially identical. If the interpretation in Bowsher is to apply here, then 
                                                 
155 We are bracketing here the complex question when and whether the President can ever “block” an 
agency head’s decision. For a good treatment, see Elena Kagan, “Presidential Administration,” 114 Harv. 
L. Rev. 2245, 2328-2331 (2001). 
156 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
157 Id. at 734. 
158 Id. at 727-32. 
159 Id. at 729, quoting 31 U.S.C. §703(e)(1)(B)(ii)-(iv). 
160 Id. at 734. 
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the President’s authority is also “very broad” and “could sustain removal” for a large 
number of actual or perceived transgressions of the presidential will. And if this is 
correct, then the President does, in fact, have a high degree of authority over the policy 
choices of the independent agencies. And if this is correct, then inclusion of the 
independent agencies within the executive order is plainly lawful, simply as a statutory 
matter. 
We do not contend that this argument is obviously correct. Because the statutory 
language appears in different contexts, it would be possible to understand the terms in the 
Comptroller General Act differently from the terms limiting presidential power over the 
independent regulatory agencies. Our argument would obviously be strengthened if, as 
we believe, constitutional objections to genuine “independence” of certain agencies 
militate against the narrow reading, which would, compared to our reading, restrict 
presidential control of the agencies.162 In light of this background constitutional concern, 
the authority of Bowsher, and the ambiguity of the statutory text, we believe that 
incorporation of the independent agencies would be lawful––a conclusion, we reiterate,163 
that has been firmly supported by both the Department of Justice and the American Bar 
Association.  
 
H. Judicial Review 
Under Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, executive orders on federal 
regulation were solely for the internal management of the executive branch, and they 
created no rights for judicial enforcement.164 If, for example, an agency’s regulatory 
analysis showed that the benefits did not justify the costs, courts were not permitted to 
consider that fact on judicial review. To be sure, some statutes require attention to both 
costs and benefits, and when this is so, the agency’s analysis of those factors can be 
challenged as arbitrary. But the process of analysis under the executive orders, and any 
disagreements within the executive branch, would not be topics for judicial consideration. 
                                                                                                                                                 
161 Id. at 729. 
162 See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, “The President and the Administration,” 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 
106-08 (1994) (analyzing the constitutional concerns raised by an agency with “complete independence 
from the President”). 
163 See supra notes 139-40. 
164 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183, 6186 (“This order is intended only to improve the 
internal management of the executive branch and is not intended to create any right, benefit, or trust 
responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity ... against the United States.”) 
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It is not difficult to understand why the executive branch would be skeptical of the 
idea of judicial intervention. As a general rule, it is not in the interest of the executive 
branch to increase the authority of the judiciary over executive officers. To be sure, 
judicial review might solve an agency problem faced by the President if courts could be 
enlisted to enforce presidential prerogatives against agencies. But the apparent judgment 
of the executive branch has been that the risks of that course, prominently including 
losses on appeal, outweigh the advantages. 
We have suggested a modest but significant change, slightly compromising the 
interests of the executive in favor of the interests of the public as a whole. Under our 
order, judicial review would be available of the materials generated pursuant to the order, 
but only to the extent that those materials are relevant to the agency’s decision under the 
relevant statute. This proposal would not violate current law; it would merely add to the 
set of materials that courts examine when testing the question whether the agency has 
followed the statute or acted arbitrarily. To be sure, this innovation would add materials 
to the file for judicial review, and in that sense would complicate the judicial task. But it 
would add little beyond what courts are now considering in the regulatory context.165 
 
IV. What Executive Orders Can and Cannot Do: A Cautionary Note 
We believe that a new executive order on federal regulation could do a great deal 
of good. One reason is the very signal that such an order would send: By virtue of its high 
visibility, and because of its source (the White House), a new order would suggest a 
serious commitment, on the part of high-level officials, to improving regulatory 
outcomes. Another reason is that such an order could embody institutional and 
substantive reforms that would reduce the problems of shallowness and narrowness. Our 
central goal has been to ensure that the commitments in previous executive orders are real 
rather than symbolic, and we believe that the steps suggested here would be helpful in 
promoting that goal. 
An executive order is not, however, a panacea; it is not sufficient for real change, 
and for some purposes it is not even necessary. With respect to the question of necessity, 
we have noted that OIRA could move in many of the directions we propose under 
                                                 
165 See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA 206 F.3d 1286 (DC Cir 2000) (ruling that chloroform 
must be treated as a threshold pollutant under the Safe Drinking Water Act). 
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existing law, including the existing executive order. Indeed, one of our major goals has 
been to outline the lessons of over two decades of experience with presidential 
requirements of cost-benefit balancing and to suggest what can be done in response to 
that experience. If a new executive order does not seem desirable or feasible, we hope 
that our discussion and our proposed order will have heuristic value, suggesting what 
should be done even without formal changes.166 With respect to the insufficiency of a 
new order, some statutes ban cost-benefit balancing, and the executive must obey the law. 
A thoroughgoing reform effort would require legislative reforms, not merely executive 
action. At the executive level itself, everything depends on implementation. It is possible 
that an executive order, like a Constitution, will be a mere “parchment barrier,”167 with 
little or no effect on the real world. In fact, successful implementation probably requires 
high-level political support, in the form, for example, of a clear understanding that the 
President or the Vice President is committed to the process inaugurated by the executive 
order. But an executive order would itself be a step toward establishing that 
understanding.  
To make the process truly effective, however, greater congressional support will 
probably be required. This support will only come if the public sees a need for greater 
transparency and accountability in the regulatory process. The reality is that most of the 
public is (usually rationally) uninformed on many regulatory issues, including the issue 
of regulatory oversight.168 And legislators do not typically have a strong incentive to 
support regulatory reforms that promote accountability. Indeed, many members of 
Congress seem to prefer to pass laws and regulations that give the appearance of fixing 
the problem––leaving it to the executive and the judiciary to sort out implementation.169 
Without stronger congressional efforts, any steps from the President will have a limited 
effect. 
                                                 
166 Note in this regard that prompt letters and return letters are being issued in significant numbers without 
any formal changes. See Prompt Letters, supra note 108; Return Letters, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gove/omb/inforeg/return_letter.html (archiving recent return letters). 
167 Jack N. Rakove, Parchment Barriers and the Politics of Rights, in A Culture of Rights: The Bill of 
Rights in Philosophy, Politics, and Law--1791 and 1991 98, 129-36 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen 
eds., 1991). 
168 For the classic discussion of rational ignorance on the part of voters, see, e.g., Anthony Downs, An 
Economic Theory of Democracy (1957),.  
169 On the political economy of regulation, see e.g., Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation (1971); Bruce M. 
Owen & Ronald Braeutigam, The Regulation Game (1978); Roger Noll, The Economics and Politics of the 




Government regulation continues to display a pattern of “paranoia and 
neglect.”170 Understood as a pragmatic tool for drawing attention to the likely effects of 
regulation, cost-benefit analysis holds out considerable promise for overcoming the 
underlying problems. For over twenty years, executive orders have attempted to 
discipline the administrative process by requiring agencies to pay close attention to both 
costs and benefits. But the overall record is mixed. In many cases, cost-benefit analysis 
does appear to have improved agency decisions in quite significant ways.171 At the same 
time, the system for OIRA review has not succeeded in fundamentally redirecting 
regulation toward areas where it would do the most good.  
Of course there are many reasons for this mixed record.172 But part of the reason, 
we suggest, is that the executive’s commitment to cost-benefit analysis remains both too 
shallow and too narrow. It is too shallow because too much of the time agencies fail to 
take the commitment seriously, and the process of OIRA review has not ensured that they 
will do so. It is too narrow because a large number of agencies are not subject to OIRA 
review at all. We have suggested a range of possible responses. To overcome 
shallowness, we have called for mandatory compliance with OMB guidelines on 
regulatory analysis; formalized the ideas of “return letters” and “prompt letters;” offered 
new principles governing substitute risks and trivial risks; clarified the issue of equity and 
distributional effects; and authorized limited judicial review of the materials generated 
through this process. To overcome narrowness, we have included the independent 
agencies, which issue many of the nation’s most important regulations, within the scope 
of the order. 
As we have discussed, an executive order, standing by itself, will not do all, or 
even nearly all, of what should be done. A great deal depends on personnel and on a 
serious commitment, on the part of high-level officials, to regulatory reform. 
Congressional support is also important. As we have emphasized, such a commitment 
could accomplish a great deal, building on what we have suggested here, under the 
                                                 
170 John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved 183, 
183 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996). 
171 See Economic Analysis at EPA, supra note 44. 
172 One reason, mentioned above, is that Congress sometimes bans cost-benefit balancing. See Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (holding that the Clean Air Act “unambiguously bars 
cost considerations” when the EPA sets ambient air quality standards under the Act). 
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existing executive order; and to reduce the reality and appearance of partisanship, there 
are clear advantages to a situation in which an administration of one party is operating 
under principles laid down under an administration of another party. But the experience 
of the last two decades suggests that a revised and improved executive order could attract 
the support of people with a wide range of political commitments, and inaugurate 
significant improvements in the system of government regulation. 
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Appendix 
A New Executive Order 
 
The American people deserve a regulatory system that protects and improves their health, 
safety, environment, and well-being without imposing unacceptable or unreasonable 
costs on society. Regulatory policies should be based on a careful assessment of the 
likely consequences of regulation, including an effort to assess and balance both costs 
and benefits. Regulatory policies should use the lowest-cost means of achieving social 
goals. Public and private resources should be devoted to large problems, not trivial ones. 
The general objective of this Executive Order is to ensure that cost-benefit analysis, 
understood as a tool to produce better decisions, will have a far larger role in the federal 
government than it now does. The particular objectives are: to ensure that regulations are 
adopted on the basis of an evaluation of their likely consequences; to promote sensible 
priority-setting; to increase attention to neglected problems while reducing expenditures 
on minor or nonexistent problems; to ensure that agencies consider alternatives to costly 
regulation; to enhance planning and coordination with respect to both new and existing 
regulations; and to make the process accessible and open to the public. In pursuing these 
objectives, the regulatory process shall be conducted so as to meet applicable statutory 
requirements and with due regard to the discretion that has been entrusted to the Federal 
agencies. 
 
Accordingly, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
SECTION 1. STATEMENT OF REGULATORY APPROACH AND REQUIREMENTS 
(A) Approach. Federal agencies should promulgate only those regulations that are 
required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are made necessary by compelling 
public need, such as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health 
and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people. In 
deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies shall assess the costs and benefits of 
reasonable regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating. Costs and 
benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent 
that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that 
are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider. Agencies should ordinarily 
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act only if the incremental benefits exceed the incremental costs. Further, in choosing 
among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should ordinarily select the approach 
that maximizes net benefits, unless a statute requires another regulatory approach. 
 
(B) Agency Requirements. To ensure that agency regulations are consistent with the 
approach set forth above, agencies shall adhere to the following requirements, to the 
extent permitted by law: 
 (1) Each agency shall identify the problem that it intends to address as well as 
assess the significance of that problem. 
 (2) Each agency shall explain why the problem that it intends to address is not 
adequately handled by private markets or by state or local authorities. 
 (3) Each agency shall examine whether existing regulations (or other law) have 
created, or contributed to, the problem that a new regulation is intended to correct and 
whether those regulations (or other law) should be modified to achieve the intended goal 
of regulation more effectively. 
 (4) Each agency shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct 
regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, 
such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing information upon which choices can 
be made by the public. 
 (5) In setting regulatory priorities, each agency shall attempt to ensure that it 
addresses serious problems rather than trivial ones and shall consider, to the extent 
reasonable, the degree and nature of the risks posed by various substances or activities 
within its jurisdiction. 
 (6) Each agency shall explore and explain whether any regulation will create 
significant new risks of any kind, and if so, shall identify the extent of any new risks in 
qualitative and quantitative terms.  
 (7) When an agency determines that a regulation is the best available method of 
achieving the regulatory objective, it shall design its regulation in the most cost-effective 
manner to achieve that objective.  
 (8) Each agency shall assess both the incremental costs and benefits of the 
intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are uncertain and 
difficult to quantify, should generally propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the incremental benefits of the intended regulation exceed its 
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incremental costs. If an agency determines to proceed even though the quantifiable 
incremental benefits do not exceed the quantifiable incremental costs, then the agency 
should explain why it intends to proceed in those circumstances, by, for example, 
referring to distributional effects as authorized by subsection (15) below.  
 (9) Each agency shall base its decisions on the best reasonably obtainable 
scientific, economic, and other information concerning the need for, and consequences 
of, the intended regulation. 
 (10) Each agency shall identify and assess reasonable alternative forms of 
regulation, including at least two reasonable alternatives to the option under 
consideration, one more stringent and one less stringent. 
 (11) Each agency shall, to the extent feasible, use performance objectives, rather 
than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt. 
 (12) Wherever feasible, agencies shall seek the views of those most likely to be 
affected, including appropriate state, local, and tribal officials before imposing regulatory 
requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect those governmental entities. As 
appropriate, agencies shall seek to reduce unnecessary conflicts between federal 
regulatory actions and other law and regulation, including that issued by state and local 
governments.  
 (13) Each agency shall avoid regulations that are inconsistent, incompatible, or 
duplicative with/of other regulations or policies. 
 (14) Each agency shall draft its regulations in language that is simple and easy to 
understand. 
 (15) Each agency shall consider, as appropriate, distributional effects, and after 
undertaking the analysis of costs and benefits, agencies shall be permitted to take account 
of those distributional effects in deciding whether to proceed. If the costs exceed the 
benefits by a substantial margin, agencies shall proceed only if the distributional effects 
are very clear and highly desirable.  
SECTION 2. ORGANIZATION 
An efficient regulatory planning and review process is vital to ensure that the Federal 
Government’s regulatory system best serves the American people. 
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(A) The Office of Management and Budget. Coordinated review of agency rulemaking is 
necessary to ensure that regulations are consistent with applicable law, the President’s 
priorities, and the principles set forth in this Executive Order, and that decisions made by 
one agency do not conflict with the policies or actions taken or planned by another 
agency. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) shall carry out that review 
function. Within OMB, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the 
repository of expertise concerning regulatory issues and should thus take the lead in 
implementing this Executive order. Where appropriate, OIRA should draw heavily on the 
expertise of the Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy in developing sound regulatory policy. To the extent permitted by law, OMB shall 
provide guidance to agencies and assist the President, the Vice President, and other 
regulatory policy advisors to the President in regulatory planning, and shall be the entity 
that reviews individual regulations, as provided by this Executive order.  
 
(B) OIRA shall be authorized to review proposed regulations. To carry out this task, 
OIRA shall issue guidelines governing regulatory impact analyses. These guidelines shall 
be issued after an appropriate period for comments from affected agencies, the private 
sector, and any interested persons. When a proposed regulation does not, in OIRA’s 
view, conform to the principles set out in this Executive Order or to OIRA guidelines for 
engaging in regulatory analysis, OIRA shall return the regulation to the agency for 
reconsideration.  
 
(C) OIRA shall be authorized to prompt agencies to undertake actions where the 
incremental benefits exceed the incremental costs. When OIRA has asked an agency to 
undertake such action, the agency shall, within 60 days, offer a public account of its  
intended course of action. 
 
(D) The Vice President. The Vice President is the principal advisor to the President on, 
and shall coordinate the development and presentation of recommendations concerning, 
regulatory policy, planning, and review, as set forth in this Executive Order. In fulfilling 
their responsibilities under this Executive Order, the President and the Vice President 
may be assisted by the regulatory policy advisors within the Executive Office of the 
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President and by such agency officials and personnel as the President and the Vice 
President may, from time to time, consult. 
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS 
For purposes of this Executive order:  
 
(A) “Advisors” refers to regulatory policy advisors consulted by the President and Vice 
President, including, among others: the Director of OMB; the Chair (or another member) 
of the Council of Economic Advisers; the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy; 
the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy; the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs; the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; the 
Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs; the Assistant to the President 
and Staff Secretary; the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice 
President; the Assistant to the President and Counsel to the President; the Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Director of the White House Office on Environmental 
Policy; and the Administrator of OIRA, who also shall coordinate communications 
relating to this Executive order among the agencies, OMB, the other Advisors, and the 
Office of the Vice President.  
 
(B) “Agency,” unless otherwise indicated, means any authority of the United States that 
is an “agency” under 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1), including those considered to be independent 
regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10).  
 
(C) “Director” means the Director of OMB.  
 
(D) “Regulation” or “rule” means an agency statement of general applicability and future 
effect, which the agency intends to have the force and effect of law, that is designed to 
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the procedure or practice 
requirements of an agency. It does not, however, include:  
  
(1) Regulations or rules that pertain to a military or foreign affairs function of the 
United States, other than procurement regulations and regulations involving the import or 
export of non-defense articles and services;  
(2) Regulations or rules that are limited to agency organization, management, or 
personnel matters; or  
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 (3) Any other category of regulations exempted by public notice of the 
Administrator of OIRA.  
 
(E) “Regulatory action” means any substantive action by an agency (normally published 
in the Federal Register) that promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a 
final rule or regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed 
rulemaking, and notices of proposed rulemaking. 
 
(F) “Significant regulatory action” means any regulatory action that is likely to result in a 
rule that may: 
 
 (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely 
affect in a material way the economy, the environment, public health or safety; 
 (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or 
planned by another agency; or 
 (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or 
loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof. 
SECTION 4. CENTRALIZED REVIEW OF REGULATIONS 
The guidelines set forth below shall apply to all regulatory actions, for both new and 
existing regulations, by agencies other than those agencies specifically exempted by 
public notice of the Administrator of OIRA: 
 
(A) Agency Responsibilities. In addition to adhering to its own rules and procedures and 
to the requirements of applicable law, each agency shall develop its regulatory actions in 
a timely fashion and adhere to the following procedures with respect to a regulatory 
action: 
(a) Each agency shall provide OIRA, at such times and in the manner specified by 
the Administrator of OIRA, with a list of its planned regulatory actions, indicating 
those which the agency believes are subject to review under this Executive order. 
Absent a material change in the development of the planned regulatory action, those 
not designated as significant will not be subject to review under this section unless, 
within 10 working days of receipt of the list, the Administrator of OIRA notifies the 
agency that OIRA has determined that a planned regulation is a significant regulatory 
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action within the meaning of this Executive Order. The Administrator of OIRA may 
by public notice waive review of any planned regulatory action designated by the 
agency as significant, in which case the agency need not further comply with 
subsection (A)(2)(b) or subsection (A)(2)(c) of this section.  
(b) For each matter identified as, or determined by the Administrator of OIRA to 
be, a significant regulatory action, the issuing agency shall provide to OIRA: 
(i) The text of the draft regulatory action, together with a reasonably detailed 
description of the need for the regulatory action and an explanation of how the 
regulatory action will meet that need. The description of need should clearly 
identify whether the regulation is designed to address a specific failure in the 
functioning of markets and how it addresses that need.  
(ii) An assessment of the potential costs and benefits of the regulatory action, 
including an explanation of the manner in which the regulatory action is 
consistent with a statutory mandate and, to the extent permitted by law, 
maximizes net economic benefits.  
(c) For those matters identified as, or determined by the Administrator of OIRA to 
be, a significant regulatory action within the scope of section 3(F)(1), the agency shall 
also provide to OIRA the following additional information developed as part of the 
agency’s decision-making process (unless prohibited by law): 
(i) An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of benefits anticipated 
from the regulatory action together with, to the extent feasible, a quantification of 
those benefits. 
(ii) An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of costs anticipated 
from the regulatory action, together with, to the extent feasible, a quantification of 
those costs; and  
(iii) An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of costs and benefits of 
potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned 
regulation––including improvements to the current regulation and viable 
nonregulatory actions such as information provision––and an explanation why the 
planned regulatory action is preferable to the identified potential alternatives.  
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(d) In emergency situations, or when an agency is obligated by law to act more 
quickly than normal review procedures allow, the agency shall notify OIRA as soon 
as possible and, to the extent practicable, comply with subsections (A)(2)(b) and (c) 
of this section. For those regulatory actions that are governed by a statutory or court-
imposed deadline, the agency shall, to the extent practicable, schedule rulemaking 
proceedings so as to permit sufficient time for OIRA to conduct its review, as set 
forth below in subsection (B)(2) through (4) of this section. 
(e) After the regulatory action has been published in the Federal Register or 
otherwise issued to the public, the agency shall: 
(i) Make available to the public, via the Internet and through other appropriate 
means, the information set forth in subsections (A)(2)(B) and (A)(2)(C); 
(ii) Identify for the public, in a complete, clear, and simple manner, the 
substantive changes between the draft submitted to OIRA for review and the 
action subsequently announced; and 
(iii) Identify for the public those changes in the regulatory action that were 
made at the suggestion or recommendation of OIRA. 
 
(B) OIRA Responsibilities. The Administrator of OIRA shall provide meaningful 
guidance and oversight so that each agency’s regulatory actions are consistent with 
applicable law, the President’s priorities, and the principles set forth in this Executive 
Order and do not conflict with the policies or actions of another agency. OIRA shall, to 
the extent permitted by law, adhere to the following guidelines: 
  
(1) OIRA shall review all actions identified by the agency or by OIRA as 
significant regulatory actions. 
 (2) OIRA shall waive review or notify the agency in writing of the results of its 
review within the following time periods: 
(a) For any notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, or other 
preliminary regulatory actions prior to a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, within 10 
working days after the date of submission of the draft action to OIRA; 
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(b) For all other regulatory actions, within 90 calendar days after the date of 
submission of the information required by this Order, unless OIRA has previously 
reviewed this information and, since that review, there has been no material change in 
the facts and circumstances upon which the regulatory action is based, in which case, 
OIRA shall complete its review within 60 days; and 
(c) The review process may be extended either (1) once by no more than 30 
calendar days upon the written approval of the Director or (2) at the request of the 
agency head. 
 (3) For each regulatory action that the Administrator of OIRA returns to an 
agency for further consideration of some or all of its provisions, the Administrator of 
OIRA shall provide the issuing agency a written explanation for such return, setting forth 
the pertinent provision of this Executive Order on which OIRA is relying.  
 (4) For each regulatory action for which the Administrator of OIRA issues a 
prompt letter, the Administrator of OIRA shall provide the issuing agency a written 
explanation for such prompt, setting forth the pertinent provision of this Executive Order 
on which OIRA is relying.  
 (5) Except as otherwise provided by law or required by a Court, in order to 
ensure greater openness, accessibility, and accountability in the regulatory review 
process, OIRA shall be governed by the following disclosure requirements: 
(a) All substantive communications between OIRA personnel and persons not 
employed by the executive branch of the Federal Government regarding a regulatory 
action under review shall be governed by the following guidelines: 
(i) A representative from the issuing agency shall be invited to any meeting 
between OIRA personnel and such person(s); 
(ii) OIRA shall forward to the issuing agency, within 10 working days of 
receipt of the communication(s), all written communications, regardless of 
format, between OIRA personnel and any person who is not employed by the 
executive branch of the Federal Government, and the dates and names of 
individuals involved in all substantive oral communications (including meetings 
to which an agency representative was invited, but did not attend, and telephone 
conversations between OIRA personnel and any such persons); and 
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(iii) OIRA shall publicly disclose relevant information about such 
communication(s), as set forth below. 
(b) OIRA shall maintain a publicly available log that shall contain, at a minimum, 
the following information pertinent to regulatory actions under review: 
(i) The status of all regulatory actions, (ii) A notation of all written 
communications forwarded to an issuing agency; and 
(iii) The dates and names of individuals involved in all substantive oral 
communications, including meetings and telephone conversations, between OIRA 
personnel and any person not employed by the executive branch of the Federal 
Government, and the subject matter discussed during such communications. 
(c) After the regulatory action has been published in the Federal Register or 
otherwise issued to the public, or after the agency has announced its decision not to 
publish or issue the regulatory action, OIRA shall make available to the public all 
documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency during the review by OIRA 
under this section. Provided, that OIRA shall make exceptions to ensure protection of 
material that is proprietary or otherwise privileged.  
 
SECTION 5: REGULATORY RETROSPECTIVE AND REGULATORY PLANNING 
 
(A) Each agency shall produce an annual report on the benefits and costs of its significant 
regulations during the past year. A draft of the annual report shall be submitted to OIRA 
to ensure an adequate period (in no case less than ninety days) for OIRA review and 
comment. 
 
(B) Each agency shall produce, by December 31 of each year, a report on its planned 
activities for the following year (“annual regulatory plan”). OIRA shall be given an 
opportunity to comment on the annual regulatory plan and to work with the relevant 
agency to ensure compliance with the requirements and principles in this order. 
SECTION 6. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS 
To the extent permitted by law, disagreements or conflicts between or among agency 
heads, or between OIRA and any agency, that cannot be resolved by the Administrator of 
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OIRA shall be resolved by the President, or by the Vice President acting at the request of 
the President, with the relevant agency head (and, as appropriate, other interested 
government officials). Vice Presidential and Presidential consideration of such 
disagreements may be initiated only by the Director, by the head of the issuing agency, or 
by the head of an agency that has a significant interest in the regulatory action at issue. 
Such review will not be undertaken at the request of other persons, entities, or their 
agents. 
 
Resolution of such conflicts shall be informed by recommendations developed by the 
Vice President, after consultation with the Advisors (and other executive branch officials 
or personnel whose responsibilities to the President include the subject matter at issue). 
The development of these recommendations shall be concluded within 60 days after 
review has been requested. 
 
At the end of this review process, the President, or the Vice President acting at the 
request of the President, shall notify the affected agency and the Administrator of OIRA 
of the President’s decision with respect to the matter. 
SECTION 7. PUBLICATION 
Except to the extent required by law, an agency shall not publish in the Federal Register 
or otherwise issue to the public any regulatory action that is subject to review under 
section 4 of this Executive Order until whichever of the following occurs first:  
 
(1) the Administrator of OIRA notifies the agency that OIRA has waived its 
review of the  
action or has completed its review without any requests for further consideration; or  
 
(2) the applicable time period expires without OIRA having notified the agency 
that it is returning the regulatory action for further consideration. If the terms of the 
preceding sentence have not been satisfied and an agency wants to publish or otherwise 
issue a regulatory action, the head of that agency may request Presidential consideration 
through the Vice President, as provided under section 6 of this Order. Upon receipt of 
this request, the Vice President shall notify OIRA and the Advisors. The guidelines and 
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time period set forth in this Order shall apply to the publication of regulatory actions for 
which Presidential consideration has been sought. 
SECTION 8. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
This Executive order is intended to improve the internal management of the Federal 
Government. Agency analyses generated by this Executive order shall be placed on file 
for judicial review and, to the extent that those analyses are relevant to the legality of the 
agency’s conduct, the reviewing court may consider them in assessing the legal issues. 
This Executive order does not otherwise create any right or benefit, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies 
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